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INTRODUCTION
N 1859, the British political philosopher John Stuart Mill published On
.Liberty,' an essay that changed the course of modern liberalism. In the
first chapter of the essay, Mill set forth a bold and pristine principle for
defining the sphere of individual liberty. He wrote:
The object of this essay is to assert one very simple
principle .... This principle is that.. . the only purpose
for which power can be exercised over any member of a
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm
to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not
a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled
to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so,
because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion
of others, it would be wise or even right .... The only
part of the conduct of anyone for which he is amenable to
society is that which concerns others. In the part which
merely concerns himself his independence is, of right,
absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the
individual is sovereign.
3
2 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Books 1974)
(1859). On Liberty represents the transition from older "classical liberalism" to modern "pro-
gressive liberalism." Mill continued to adhere in many ways to the classical liberals' commit-
ment to limited government and to a (largely) free market. Yet, in at least two other ways, his
conception of freedom is distinctly modern. Where classical liberals thought of freedom as
simply the absence of government, Mill began to associate freedom with what we might call
"self-individuation," the progressive refinement of individual uniqueness. See ISAIAH BERLIN,
JOHN STUART MILL AND THE ENDS OF LIFE 8 (1959); J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY IN Focus 72-89
(John Gray & G.W. Smith eds., Routledge 199I) (discussing Mill's conception of freedom);
JOHN GRAY, MILL ON LIBERTY: A DEFENSE 1-9 (2d ed. 1996) (1983). See also John Lawrence
Hill, Mill, Freud and Skinner: The Concept of the Self and the Moral Psychology of Liberty, 26 SETON
HALL L. REV. 92, 1I6-18 (1995) (discussing Mill's conception of self); John Lawrence Hill,
The Five Faces of Freedom in American Political and Constitutional Thought, 45 B.C. L. REV. 499,
561-79 (2004) (discussing the idea of freedom as self-individuation).
3 MILL, supra note 2, at 68.
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Mill's "harm principle," as it came to be called, holds that the only
legitimate justification for the state to limit the liberty of the person is the
prevention of harm to third parties.4 This principle has had a powerful
symbolic influence on American constitutional ideals, presaging, in
particular, the modern right to privacy.' The most important consequence
of the harm principle is that it rejects, as inconsistent with the principles
of a free society, laws which prohibit private or "self-regarding" acts on
grounds that the majority believes the activity to be morally objectionable.
The term "morals legislation" has been used to designate laws prohibiting
activities such as consensual homosexual relations, abortion, adultery,
fornication, prostitution, bestiality, bigamy, adult incest, sadomasochism,
gambling, the use of illegal drugs, euthanasia, and assisted suicide, to name
a few.6 To the extent that the right to privacy is understood in Millian
4 See id.
5 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965) (elaborating a privacy right
encompassing a zone of protected personal activity marked out by the non-public nature
of the conduct protected by the right). Mill referred to this private realm as the domain of
"self-regarding" activities-acts that do not directly harm third parties. See MILL, supra note 2,
at 70. The self-regarding domain consists principally of three regions:
[F]irst, the inward domain of consciousness, demanding liberty of con-
science.., liberty of thought and feeling, absolute freedom of opinion, and
sentiment on all subjects.... Secondly, the.., liberty of tastes and pursuits,
of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character.. without impedi-
ment from our fellow creatures as long as what we do does not harm them
.... Thirdly, ... [the] freedom to unite for any purpose not involving harm
to others ....
MILL, supra note 2, at 71. While the modern right to privacy has never fully embraced Mill's
expansive conception of individual freedom, there have occasionally been opinions which
have come close to aspiring to the breadth of Mill's principle, including Justice Douglas's
concurrence in Roev Wade. In his concurrence, Douglas argues that three similar categories of
human activity should be absolutely protected from the reach of law. See Doe v. Bolton, 410
U.S. 179,211-13 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (Justice Douglas's concurrence was issued for
both Roev. Wade and Doe v. Bolton) (explaining that there should be absolute protection for the
"autonomous control of the development and expression of one's intellect, interests, tastes
and personality.., freedom of choice in the basic decisions of one's life [including] marriage,
divorce, procreation, contraception, education, and upbringing of children ... [and] freedom
to care for one's health and person, freedom from bodily constraint or compulsion, freedom to
walk, stroll, or loaf").
6 See 4 JOEL FEINBERG, 'ME MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS WRONG-
DOING (1988) (providing one of the most comprehensive recent philosophical treatments of
the concept and legitimacy of morals legislation and giving a definition, criticism, and tax-
onomy of kinds of legal moralism). The locus c/assicus of the debate between liberals and
conservatives is found in Law, Liberty, andMorality and the The Enforcement of Liberty. Compare
H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963) (defending the liberal position and criticiz-
ing legal moralism) with PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALs (1965) (defending
morals legislation).
The debate ensued after Devlin criticized the findings of the British Wolfenden
Commission, a public commission which studied the legal treatment of homosexual-
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terms, it would immunize from constitutional attack all such laws, at least
to the extent that they do not directly harm third parties.
Over the course of the last twenty-five years, the Supreme Court has
adopted an increasingly Millian gloss to its Due Process jurisprudence. In
1986, Justice Stevens declared in his dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick7 that
"the fact that a governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a
particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law
prohibiting the practice... ."' Justice Kennedy, writing the Court's majority
opinion which overturned state sodomy laws, cited these comments with
approval in 2003 in Lawrence v. Texas.9 Kennedy declared that while
objections to homosexuality "are not trivial concerns, but profound and
deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles ... [the issue
is whether the majority may use the power of the State to enforce these
views on the whole society through operation of the criminal law."' ° The
opinion answered this question in the negative, declaring that the Texas
law "furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into
ity and prostitution and recommended decriminalizing these activities and prohibiting only
"pimping" and public advertising of prostitutes. See DEVLIN, supra note 6. The Wolfenden
Commission's conclusions were strikingly parallel to Mill's own slightly veiled conclusions on
these issues a century earlier. Compare THE WOLFENDEN REPORT: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION 187-91 (Authorized Am. Edition, Stein and
Day 1963) (i957) (arguing for the decriminalization of homosexuality and prostitution), with
MILL, supra note 2, at 169-70 (explaining that "fornication ... must be tolerated ..." but
"there is considerable force in these arguments" that, though private activities must be left
free of interference, participants "may be compelled to conduct their operations with a certain
degree of secrecy and mystery so that ... the procurer, but not the fornicator may be pun-
ished").
There has been no deficit of legal treatment of the many moral, political, prudential, and
constitutional issues concerning morals legislation. See generally Louis Henkin, Morals andthe
Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 391 (1963); Ronald Dworkin, Lord Devlin
and the Enforcement ofMorals, 75 YALE L.J. 986 (1966); Peter M. Cicchino, Reason and the Rule of
Law: Should Bare Assertions of "Public Morality" Qualify as Legitimate Government Interests for the
Purposes of EqualProtection Review?, 87 GEo. L.J. 139 (1998); Michael J. Sandel, MoralArgument
and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 CAL. L. REV. 521 (1989); Don Welch, The
State as a Purveyor of Morality, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 540 (1988); Jeremy Waldron, Particular
Values and Critical Morality, 77 CAL. L. REV. 561 (1989); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based
Justficationsfor Law-Making: Before and After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 M INN. L. REV. 1233 (zoo4);
Gregory Kalscheur, S.J., Moral Limits on Morals Legislation: Lessons for U.S. Constitutional Law
From the Declaration on Religious Freedom, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. I (2006); Kelly Egan,
Comment, Morality-Based Legislation is Alive and Well: Why the Law Permits Consent to Body
Modification but not Sadomasochistic Sex, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1615 (2007); Keith Burgess-Jackson,
Our Millian Constitution: The Supreme Court's Repudiation of Immorality as a Ground of Criminal
Punishment, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 407 (2004); Markus Dirk Dubber, Toward
a ConstitutionalLaw of Crime andPunishment, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 509 (2004).
7 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
8 Id. at 2 16 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
9 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
Io Id. at 571.
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the personal and private life of the individual."" This led Justice Scalia to
declare in his dissent that the Court's conclusion "effectively decrees the
end of all morals legislation."'"
The central contention of this Article is that, contrary to the best
hopes of some libertarians and the worst fears of some conservatives,
recent constitutional cases do not sound the death knell for most forms of
"morals legislation." It is well within the constitutional authority of the
states to achieve many, though not quite all, of the types of state interests
traditionally associated with the "moral function of law." More generally,
this Article argues that there has been something profoundly artificial
about the "morals legislation" debate, particularly since the famous Hart-
Devlin debate of the 1960s. 13 Like most liberals, Hart rejected "morals
legislation" broadly on the basis of Mill's harm principle, a principle he and
most other liberals have explicitly rejected in other respects. 4 Like many
conservatives, Lord Devlin himself grudgingly concluded that consensual
adult homosexual activity should not be subject to legal sanction, even as
he defended an expansive conception of state power to reach behavior
which the majority regards as immoral. 5
This Article argues that, in seeking to protect the private activities of
gays and lesbians, liberals from Hart on have thought it necessary to throw
the baby out with the bathwater by maintaining that the state may never
regulate on the basis of "private morals." The better conclusion is that
society has now reached a general consensus that it is wrong to single out
one type of sexual activity and mark for punishment the class of people who
engage in it. This, indeed, is the meaning of Lawrence v. Texas, and not the
more expansive claim that Lawrence declares the end of morals legislation.
Part I sets the stage by examining the philosophical background of the
"morals legislation" debate. It offers a clear definition of morals legislation,
briefly tracks the philosophically contested issues between liberals and
conservatives from Mill's time to our own, and examines the concept of
"harm" as Mill and more recent liberals have understood it. This Article
argues that while it is sometimes assumed that there exists a clear, hermetic
distinction between "public" and "private," marked off by this concept of
a discrete harm to third parties, the concept of "harm" is considerably more
ambiguous and laden with normative underpinnings than some theorists
have appreciated. Indeed, liberals today have a considerably broader idea
I I Id. at 578.
12 Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
13 See HART, supra note 6 (defending a version of Mill's liberal position); DEVLIN, supra
note 6 (making a conservative rejoinder to Hart).
14 See infra note 19 (discussing modern liberals' embrace of paternalism).
15 See DEVLIN, supra note 6, at v ("I do not think there is any good the law can do that
outweighs the misery that exposure and imprisonment causes .... Punishment will not cure
and because it is haphazard in its incidence I doubt if it deters.").
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of harm than Mill, leaving the way open to greater government intervention
into the personal sphere than Mill would have defended.
Parts II through V discuss the constitutional limitations on morals
legislation. Part II examines the scope of the modern privacy right and
the analogous Due Process doctrines. It highlights the uneven protection
accorded to various self-regarding activities, from abortion to consensual
sexual relations to assisted suicide. The main thrust of Part II is to show that
the modern right to privacy, as it has been elaborated over the past forty-
five years, falls far short of the expansive contours of the harm principle.
Few behaviors which Mill considered self-regarding are protected by the
modern right to privacy. Part III surveys the strictures of rational basis
review and examines particular "means" and "ends" problems confronting
those who challenge morals legislation. Part IV examines the idea of a
legitimate state interest and explores which morality-related ends meet
the legitimate state interest test.
Additionally, Part IV introduces five classes of morality-related state
interests, including (1) the regulation of the secondary effects of private
activity (e.g., regulating prostitution to prevent related, secondary crimes),
(2) the regulation of offensive, non-harmful conduct (e.g., indecent
exposure), (3) state interests which seek to assist in the development of
moral character, (4) interests which protect abstract moral values without
any reference to impact on particular individuals (e.g., protecting the value
of respect for life or the value of non-discrimination), and (5) state interests
which promote "morality as such." The fifth (and most controversial) class
of interests is purely expressive in nature. The interests included in the
fifth class have no other goal than to amplify and project the majority's moral
disapproval of a particular activity. As we move through the five classes,
the basis for regulation grows less "empirical" and more "normative" or
morality-oriented. We will see that most liberals permit regulation in
furtherance of (1) and (2) but draw various lines after this point, invariably
refusing to admit regulation on the basis of (5). This Article argues that
while the philosophical debate between liberals and conservatives has
centered largely on (5), defenders of morals legislation can achieve virtually
everything they seek to achieve under classes (1) through (4). Thus, while
the debate between liberals and conservatives is of philosophical interest,
it is not significant as a practical, constitutional matter.
Finally, Part V, "Three Readings of Lawrence," discusses three alternative
interpretations of the decision and argues thatLawrenceshould be understood
as a sober, coherent, but limited, restriction on the power of the state to
foster, express, and reinforce public morality. Lawrence, as argued, should
be understood as another in a line of "rational relation" cases that prohibit
states from discriminating against vulnerable or unpopular minorities. The
Article concludes that fornication and adultery statutes, which come closest
to anti-sodomy statutes in terms of the activity they seek to regulate, are
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not immune from state regulation under the Constitution.
I. MORALS LEGISLATION AND THE HARM PRINCIPLE
A. Some Difficulties with the Concept of "Morals Legislation"
The harm principle entails that the state has no right to enact laws
which limit any act, whether committed alone or in union with others,
that does not bring about direct and material harm to a third party.16 From
Mill's time forward, political philosophers have recognized that consistent
application of the harm principle prevents government from having two
common motivations for legislation: protecting the individual from the
potentially harmful consequences of his own acts (legal paternalism)17 and
preventing non-harmful activities because they are at least believed to
be immoral (legal moralism).'8 Many contemporary liberals reject Mill's
staunch anti-paternalism and, as such, do not accept the harm principle in
toto.19 Yet, they remain followers of Mill to the extent that they contend
that the state has no right to "legislate morality," a position which ostensibly
i6 See MILL, supra note 2, at 68-69 ("[Tjhe only purpose for which power can be right-
fully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm
to others."). Mill made it clear that the injury must be direct and specific to particular indi-
viduals saying,
[Blut with regard to the merely contingent or, as it may be called, con-
structive injury which a person causes to society by conduct which nei-
ther violates any specific duty to the public, nor occasions perceptible
hurt to any assignable individual except himself, the inconvenience is
one that society can afford to bear, for the sake of the greater good of
human freedom.
Id. at 149. Consequently, acts done to, and with, other consenting adults generally fall within
the self-regarding realm with some restrictions to be discussed shortly. Id. at 168-469.
17 See MILL, supra note 2, at 68 (declaring that the individual's "own good, either physical
or moral, is not a sufficient warrant" to legally proscribe his conduct). The essence of pater-
nalism is to limit a person's freedom to protect his own well-being. See PATERNALISM (Rolf
Satorius ed., 1983) (compiling the best essays on the concept of paternalism). See also 3 JOEL
FEINBERG, IIE MORAL LIMITs OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO SELF 3-23 (1986) (providing
the most extensive and recent philosophical defense of the liberal case against paternalism).
18 HART, supra note 6, at 6 (apparently coining the term "legal moralism"). Hart's book
was a compilation of his Harry Camp Lectures delivered at Stanford in 1962. See HART, supra
note 6.
19 See HART, supra note 6, at 32-33 (asserting that Mill carried the fear of paternalism
to "fantastic" extremes and claimed that modern liberals' more receptive attitude to pater-
nalism is due, "in part, to a general decline in the belief that individuals know their own
interests best and to an increased awareness of a great range of factors which diminish the
significance to be attached to an apparently free choice or to consent"); ROBERT E. GOODIN,
Permissible Paternalism: In Defense of the Nanny State, in ThE ESSENTIAL COMMUNITARIAN READER
115, 115-23 (Amitai Etzioni ed., 1998) (defending the legitimacy of paternalism in a broad
number of areas).
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marks one of the principal dividing lines between modern liberalism and
conservatism. z0
The standard understanding of morals legislation is that it involves
laws which regulate or prohibit private acts on grounds that the majority
believes them to be immoral. This captures the basic idea, but there
are two difficulties worthy of note. First, morals laws sometimes extend
beyond the "private," prohibiting activities which are indeed "public."
Consider such undeniably public activities as publicly offensive conduct,
public profanity, obscenity, lewdness in public, and indecent exposure, all
of which are often considered instances of morals legislation. Also consider
the act of adultery which may be considered "private" or self-regarding as
2o At least five different varieties of justifications have been offered for prohibiting mor-
als legislation. The most all-encompassing, and the most consistent with Mill's position, is
that of modern libertarianism. Libertarians frequently rely on an objective natural rights phi-
losophy to argue that the state must remain neutral among competing conceptions of the
good so long as the individual does not infringe the rights of others. See, e.g., ROBERT NozICK,
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974); MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, THE ETHICS OF LIBERTY (1998);
RANDY BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY (1998).
A second diametrically-opposed view holds that all moral judgments are irredeemably
subjective or "relative," so that the state has no legitimate basis for choosing one conception
of the good life over others. See RICHARtD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE 72-90 (1999)
(defending a "pragmatic" version of ethical relativism).
A third view counsels neutrality on utilitarian grounds, asserting that government neutral-
ity among competing lifestyles and choices promotes maximal utility by permitting each to
pursue his own lifestyle choices. Mill himself sought to ground the harm principle on utility,
though he added that he meant "utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent inter-
ests of man as a progressive being." MILL, supra note 2, at 70. Jeremy Bentham, utilitarianism's
most famous exponent, argued that private consensual acts between adults were "unmeet for
punishment" because punishment was groundless since the parties had consented, and no
harm to third parties occurred. JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION
170-72 (Prometheus Books 1988) (1789). Richard Posner formulated a more recent version
of the utilitarian approach in this regard. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
(2oo6) (putting forth an economic-utilitarian defense of privacy rights); RICHARD A. POSNER,
SEXAND REASON 241-434 (1992) (examining facets of the economic approach to sexual regula-
tions).
A fourth approach, grounded on "minimalist" or pragmatic assumptions, holds that since
persons inevitably disagree about morality and religion, these decisions should simply be
bracketed from legal treatment in order to preserve political compromise in the spirit of liberal
toleration. See e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 9-11 (1993) (asserting that neutrality
permits achievement of an "overarching consensus" among different groups).
Yet it is the fifth justification, one based on neo-Kantian notions of personal autonomy,
that has proven to be the most popular and enduring among liberal advocates of a robust
interpretation of the privacy principle. For example, John Rawls has argued that the two
principles of justice he develops in A Theory of Justice, which he calls "justice as fairness,"
have a similar limiting function on state intervention in the private sphere. See JOHN RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE 330-3 1 (1972). He writes, "Justice as fairness requires us to show that
modes of conduct interfere with the basic liberties of others or else violate some obligations
or natural duty before they can be restricted." Id. at 331. See also ALAN GEWIETH, REASON
AND MORALITY (1978) (describing a philosophical defense of a neo-Kantian ethics); RONALD
DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 235-89 (1985) (citing Posner's approach).
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between the participants but is arguably neither in the larger sense because
the interests of a third party, the cuckolded spouse, are obviously affected.
These examples highlight the deeper ambiguities inherent with our
concept of privacy. As commonly used today, "privacy" denotes three
different aspects of an activity: the place where an act occurs (e.g., that it
occurs "behind closed doors"), the nature of the act (e.g., that it is considered
consensual or self-regarding), and the consequences of the act (e.g., that it
does no harm to third parties). Torturing an individual within the confines
of a secluded dungeon owned by the torturer is "private" in the first but
not the latter two senses. Adultery may be private in the first and second,
but not the third sense. Adultery may occur out of range of the public
and be "self-regarding" in the sense that it is consensual as between the
two parties engaged in the act and, yet, not be "private" in the third sense
because the interests of the cuckolded spouse are obviously affected.
Some activities (e.g., making a contract) may be private in the second
and third senses in that they are consensual and non-harmful even though
they obviously take place in public. Other acts may be private only in the
loosest, third sense of the term. Indecent exposure or other forms of lewd
and offensive conduct may occur in public and be non-consensual so that
they are "public" in the first two senses while still not being harmful in
the strict sense, as required by the third conception of privacy. Those who
defend a broader conception of state power may go further, insisting that
even some acts that meet all three conditions are not truly private if they
harm one of the participants themselves. Even some liberals have argued,
for example, that extreme sado-masochistic activities should be prohibited
on grounds that, while they may meet each of these three definitions of
privacy, they are still a matter of public concern in that they harm one of
the participants themselves."'
In sum, if all activities regulated by morals legislation are "private,"
as the traditional understanding assumes, it is only because our concept
of the "private" is hopelessly equivocal. Additionally, there is a second
deeper problem with the usual understanding of morals legislation. The
usual definition suggests that morals legislation functions in an entirely
distinct manner from other criminal laws (which prohibit everything from
murder to insider trading). The traditional understanding suggests that
these other laws regulate on the basis of the effects (e.g., to prevent the
harmful consequences of the acts) while morals laws are mainly expressive
in function (e.g., they regulate as an emanation of the moral repugnance of
the majority without reference to the activity's social effects). Conservatives
21 But see MILL, supra note 2, at 173 (arguing that an agent who voluntarily assumes the
risk cannot be "harmed" since he has consented to the risk and stating that "the principle of
freedom cannot require that he be free not be free" when discussing the voluntary selling of
oneself into permanent involuntary servitude); I JOEL FEINBERG, ThE MORAL LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 115-1 7 (1984).
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themselves have usually fostered this fallacy and have suffered the
consequences for it as liberals have made easy sport of their arguments."2
The problem with viewing the distinction between morals legislation
and other criminal laws in this way is that ordinary criminal laws are
motivated by the same kinds of strongly-felt moral outrage as are morals
laws. The prohibition of murder seeks to deter the harm of murder, but
it also expresses and reinforces the community's sense of moral outrage
directed toward the act of murder. Indeed, some polls indicate that people
normally feel considerably less "moral outrage" toward prostitution or
other morals-based laws than they do toward murder, rape, and theft.
23
This, obviously, makes sense because our level of moral outrage should
normally be expected to closely track the harm incurred by the activity.
Thus, the typical understanding of morals legislation is misleading to the
extent that it suggests that morals laws function in a merely "expressive"
manner while other criminal laws function to prevent real harms.
Conversely, morals laws can be justified in the same way as traditional
criminal laws, as prophylactic measures intended to prevent certain kinds
of social harms. The only difference between morals legislation and laws
prohibiting murder, theft, and rape, as we shall see, is that morals laws seek
to contain less material social effects that fall short of our usual ideas of
harm. Morals laws may seek to prevent offensive but non-harmful behavior
or developmental harms caused, for example, by exposure of adolescents
to obscene or sexually explicit material. They may seek to prevent the
erosion of certain essential human values such as respect for life, equality,
non-discrimination, etc. In sum, morals laws are as preventative of certain
kinds of social effects as ordinary criminal laws, except that they seek to
prevent less material and more abstract social evils.
Indeed, as argued within, it is impossible to fully disentangle the harm-
preventing from the value-preserving aspects of law; they are functionally-
intertwined. 4 In sum, there is no suigeneris difference between the function
of morals laws and other laws; morals legislation should not be conceived
and cannot be justified in purely "expressive" terms. Such laws can only
be justified as a societal response to the negative social effects generated
by putatively self-regarding activity, albeit effects which do not qualify as
"harms" in the Millian sense.
22 See infra Part II.
23 "A 1985 opinion survey conducted by the United States Department of Justice ranked
prostitution 17 4th in severity out of 204 crimes ranging from first-degree murder to school
truancy..." while the 175th ranked offense was a store owner knowingly mislabeling the size
of eggs prior to sale. ROBERT M. HARDAWAY, No PRICE Too HIGH: VICTIMLESS CRIMES AND THE
NirT AMENDMENT 24 (2003).
24 See infra Part IV.E.
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B. The Near Irrelevance of the Philosophical Debate
There is a large and ever-burgeoning body of philosophical literature
on morals legislation which provides the backdrop for contemporary legal
debate on the subject.25 As we will see, however, both the prevailing
liberal and conservative positions are cast at a level that floats above the
terrafirma of modern constitutional jurisprudence. Liberals from before
Mill's time have claimed that the state should have no power to regulate
morality; 6 yet the Supreme Court has never questioned the police power
of the state to regulate health, safety and morals.7 By the same token,
however, the Supreme Court has never entertained the broad conservative
claim that the state must be able, at least in principle, to reach every form
of conduct, 8 nor have states attempted to legislate on the basis of some
abstract conception of natural law or to regulate "morality for the sake of
morality" as conservatives have sometimes insisted. 9
Moreover, even at a philosophical level, the liberal-conservative debate
is often more illusory than real. When cast at the level of principle, the
debate appears to be one of clashing, incompatible, political paradigms
25 For some of the more important representative theoretical works (aside from the
works of Mill, Hart, and Devlin), see generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
240-58 (1978) (defending the liberal position); FEINBERG, supra note 6 (explaining and de-
fending Millian liberalism); JOHN FINNis, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980) (describ-
ing a philosophical defense of the natural law tradition); ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN
MORAL (1993) (defending morals legislation from the perspective of the modern natural law
tradition); MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW (1988) (defending a post-liberal
"transformative" conception of politics); JOSEPH RAZ, ThE MoRALITY OF FREEDOM (1986) (de-
tailing a philosophical defense of pluralistic perfectionism); DAVID A. RICHARDS, SEX, DRUGS,
DEATH, AND THE LAW (1982) (repudiating morals legislation); JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN,
LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY (Stuart Warner ed., Liberty Fund 1993) (1873) (providing an
early conservative critique of Mill).
z6 See WILHELM VON HUMBOLDT, 'ME LIMITS OF STATE ACTION (J.W. Borrow ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1969) (1851) (launching the first truly libertarian attack on the morals
function of the law).
27 By the mid-nineteenth century, the Supreme Court routinely included the power to
regulate morals within the scope of the police power. See Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S.
504, 592 (1847) (encompassing the regulation of any activity injurious to the health or morals
of the community); Muggier v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661-62 (1887) (stating that police power
extends to "protect the public health, the public morals and the public safety" as applied to
the regulation of alcohol). The Court subsequently recognized Congress's power to regulate
on the basis of morality. See Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 356-57 (1903) (regulating lot-
teries). See also Goldberg, supra note 6 at 1247-58 (2004) (detailing the history of the power to
regulate morality in American history).
28 See DEVLIN, supra note 6, at 12 ("[Ilt is not possible to set theoretical limits to the
power of the State to legislate against immorality.").
29 See infra Part IV.E. (discussing whether the state has a legitimate state interest in
regulating "morality as such").
2009-20101
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
with conservatives assaulting the Millian bastion that divides the personal
sphere from the realm of public power, while liberals defend it at all costs
as the sanctum sanctorum of political liberalism. Yet, for many liberals and
conservatives, these pristine differences on matters of principle melt away
at the level of application. Nevertheless, a brief treatment of the debate is
warranted.
Students of American jurisprudence have, for the last forty years,
learned of the Hart-Devlin debate of the 1960s and, before that, James
Fitzjames Stephen's attack on Mill in the 1870s. 31 The Hart-Devlin
debate was sparked by the 1957 release in Britain of the Wolfenden Report,
which recommended the decriminalization of consensual homosexual acts
and prostitution (though the Report concluded that public solicitation
and advertising could be limited).31 These were essentially the same
conclusions Mill reached almost exactly a century earlier.
3
1
In the more contemporary debate, Mill's position was defended by
H.L.A. Hart, the don of jurisprudence at Oxford, while the conservative
jurist Lord Patrick Devlin took a position close to that of Stephen.33 Hart
argued, as the Wolfenden Report put it, that there is "a realm of private
morality and immorality which is, in brief and crude terms, not the law's
business."'3 Yet in practice, Hart and most contemporary liberals cede much
of the territory Mill hoped to claim with the harm principle. Surprisingly,
Hart suggested, for example, that bigamy could be prohibited as a form of
public offense to religious feelings. 35 Nor was he opposed to paternalism:
I do not propose to defend all that Mill said; for I myself
think there may be grounds justifying the legal coercion of
30 See STEPHEN, supra note 25. Stephen first published his book in 1873, the year that
Mill died. See RICHARD POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 259 (1995). Stephen has been described as
"the first neo-conservative." Id. at 259-70.
31 See THE WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 6, at 187-89.
32 Mill concluded that fornication "must be tolerated" and while he does not mention
homosexual relations specifically, the logic of the surrounding argument appears to cover gay
as well as straight sex outside of marriage. See MILL, supra note 2, at 169. In regards to pros-
titution, he was concerned about the public effects of solicitation and concluded that "there
is considerable force" in the suggestion that prostitutes and gambling houses "may be com-
pelled to conduct their operations with a certain degree of secrecy and mystery, so that nobody
knows anything about them but those who seek them . I..." d. at 170.
33 See DEVLIN, supra note 6.
34 HART, supra note 6, at 14- 15 (quoting 'ME WOLFENDEN REPORT: REPORT OF THE
COMMITrEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITtrrIoN 48 (Authorized Am. Edition, Stein
and Day 1963) (1957)).
35 See HART, supra note 6, at 42-43 (banning bigamy would depend on weighing the
invasion of the interests of potential bigamists against the seriousness of the affront to others'
feelings). Notably, Hart also makes very clear that regulating bigamy is utterly different from
attempts to enforce sexual morality, which Hart thought was beyond the scope of the law. Id.
at 43.
[Vol. 98
MORALS LEGISLATION
the individual other than the prevention of harm to others.
But on the narrower issue relevant to the enforcement of
morality Mill seems to me to be right.
36
Many contemporary liberals go further, advocating restrictions of
prostitution, pornography, smoking, and even recently, the use of trans fats
in restaurant cuisine.37 Mill would have objected to each of these, ruling
them out as legitimate objects of legislation under his harm principle.
Indeed, liberals differ from conservatives today less about whether the
law can regulate a particular activity than abouthow it should regulate. Most
non-libertarian liberals agree with conservatives, for example, that the law
has a role in preventing serious drug use, but frequently prefer a less punitive,
more therapeutic approach to the problem.38 Where conservatives may
wish to punish prostitution as a moral offense which threatens the family,
liberals want to regulate it on grounds that prostitution is exploitative of
prostitutes, engenders negative stereotypes about women, or commodifies
sexuality.39 Liberals also question the efficacy of the criminal sanction in
prohibiting putatively self-regarding acts but seldom today do they adopt
the true Millian position that these activities should simply be off-limits to
the State.
If modern liberals have ceded a great deal of territory in the morals
legislation debate, contemporary conservatives are usually found fighting on
the wrong front altogether. Rather than defending the legitimacy of morals
legislation on the sensible grounds that they are required as prophylactic
measures against the potentially harmful public effects of such activities
as drug use, prostitution, bigamy, adultery, assisted suicide, and other
activities, conservatives from Stephen to Devlin have staked their case on
the intensity of the felt animus of the moral majority.4' They have argued
as if morals laws are justified by nothing more than the strong feelings of
36 Id. at 5.
37 SeePATERNALISM,SUpra note 17 (essays defending paternalistic intervention in different
contexts).
38 Compare SAMUEL WALKER, SENSE AND NONSENSE ABOUT CRIME AND DRUGS: A POLICY
GUIDE (2oo6) (arguing for a more proactive, interventionist and therapeutic approach to the
war on drugs), with Off With Their Heads: Thoughts from the Drug Czar, WASH. POST, June zo,
1989 at Az I (quoting President Reagan's former drug czar, William Bennett, who, when asked
whether the authorities should consider beheading drug offenders, responded, "Morally, I
don't have any problem with it").
39 Compare GEORGE GILDER, MEN AND MARRIAGE 5 (2d prtg. 1986) ("In creating civiliza-
tion, women transform male lust into love, channel male wanderlust into jobs, homes and
families; link men to specific children, rear children into citizens; change hunters into fa-
thers; divert male will to power into a drive to create.") with Priscilla Alexander, Prostitution: A
DiffiultIssuefor Feminists, reprinted in Mary Becker, et. al., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEMINIST
JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY (1994) (arguing that society channels sexuality in
order to create families and sublimate male energy to higher pursuits).
40 See, e.g., STEPHEN, supra note 25, at 62; DEVLIN, supra note 6, at 14-17.
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the "average citizen" (or as Devlin called him, "the man in the Clapham
omnibus"), rather than by the harmful social effects of these activities.4'
Stephen was famous for a particularly incendiary brand of rhetoric that
conceived of morals laws as a persecution for the grosser forms of vice.
4
1
He justified morals legislation on the basis of "the feeling of hatred and
the desire of vengeance [which] are important elements in human nature"
and which he thought should "be satisfied in a regular, public and legal
manner."43 He grounded the legitimacy of morals legislation even more
explicitly on the retributive and expressive or cathartic functions of the
criminal law stating, "You cannot punish anything which public opinion,
as expressed in the common practice of society, does not strenuously and
unequivocally condemn.... To be able to punish, a moral majority must be
overwhelming."
More recent conservatives, including Lord Devlin, seem to have been
led similarly off course by the dichotomy, implicit in Stephen's rhetoric,
between laws which prevent harm and laws which express the moral outrage
of the "moral majority." Devlin argued that it was enough for the legitimacy
of morals laws that they express the "intolerance, indignation, and disgust"
4
of "the man on the Clapham omnibus." 46 Like Stephen, he thought that
the depth of moral outrage served as the touchstone to the legitimacy of
morals legislation. "No society can do without intolerance, indignation,
and disgust; they are the forces behind the moral law. ' 47 Without them,
the feelings of society cannot be weighty enough to deprive the individual
of freedom of choice." He followed with a ringing endorsement of the
unlimited power of the State to reach all personal behavior on the basis of
the majority's felt repugnance toward an activity. "It is no more possible
to define a sphere of private morality than it is to define one of private
subversive activity.... There are no theoretical limits to the power of the
State to legislate against treason and sedition, and likewise I think there
can be no theoretical limits to legislation against immorality.
'49
The consensus today is that Hart demolished Devlin's argument. 0
Indeed, Devlin's views have been rightly criticized from two sides. Liberal
41 DEVLIN, supra note 6, at 15.
42 STEPHEN, supra note 25, at 162.
43 Id. Butsee HART, supra note 6, at 6o-64 (criticizing Stephen's moralistic animus).
44 STEPHEN, supra note 25, at 172-73 (showing that Stephen may have been the first to
use this term "moral majority").
45 DEVLIN, supra note 6, at 17
46 Id. at 15. See also id. at 17 ("[Ilt is the power of a common sense and not the power of
reason that is behind the judgments of society.").
47 Id. at 17.
48 Id. at 16-17.
49 Id. at 14.
50 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 242-47 (1977).
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critics from Hart on have pointed out that Devlin's views are wrong
as a historical matter since social morality frequently evolves without
destroying the essential moral fabric of societies."s On the other hand, some
conservatives have pointed out that Devlin's argument exhibits a kind of
cultural relativism; what seems to count is not whether the prohibited
activity is actually wrongful, but simply that a majority disapproves of it.
52
The appropriateness of the charge is underscored by a certain irony since
conservatives usually level the charge of relativism against liberals.
In sum, the liberal-conservative debate has been a non-starter since
most liberals do not accept the extreme Millian understanding of the harm
principle, and most conservatives have much stronger practical arguments
for morals legislation than those they typically deploy in the debate.
Indeed, there is much more agreement between liberals and conservatives
on these issues than usually acknowledged. Only with respect to abortion
and consensual, non-commercial sexual activity between adults (e.g.,
adultery, fornication, and homosexual acts) have liberals and conservatives
parted ways.
C. The Concept of Harm
The harm principle, as Mill presented it in his introductory chapter in
On Liberty, appears at first to be a powerful and unitary principle that bisects
our social world into two mutually opposed realms: an inner self-regarding
domain of activity with which society may not interfere and an outer social
sphere of "other-regarding" activity.53 Both Mill and his contemporary
51 See Hart, supra note 6. To Devlin's argument that a society was equivalent to its moral-
ity such that any shift in morality represents the dissolution of society, Hart pointed out that
no reputable historian has maintained this thesis and compared it to Justinian's claim that ho-
mosexuality causes earthquakes. Id. at 5o . Hart concluded that a gradual change in a society's
morality would, if anything, be more like a peaceful constitutional change in government than
its violent overthrow. Id. at 52.
52 The charge of relativism stems from Devlin's view that the strongly felt feelings that
undergird the cohesiveness of any society, no matter how bad the substantive content of its
morality, is all that is necessary to justify the imposition of that morality. This "conservative"
justification for morals legislation could justify "Nazi morality," the "morality" of Apartheid,
or the morality of any regime or society that violates human rights. Natural law theorists such
as Robert George criticize Devlin for this point. See GEORGE, supra note 25, at 79 (concluding
that the central [natural law] tradition rejects Devlin's relativism and his noncognitivism).
53 Mill stated that the inner realm encompasses an "inward domain of consciousness"
consisting of three kinds of freedom: first, liberty of conscience, of thought and feeling, "ab-
solute freedom of opinion and sentiments on all subjects" and the liberty of expressing and
publishing these opinions; second, the "liberty of tastes and pursuits, of framing the plan of
our own life to suit our character, of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may
follow," as long as this does not violate the interests of others; and, third, complete freedom
of association, the "freedom to unite for any purpose not involving harm to others." MILL,
supra note 2, at 7 1.
Justice Douglas used substantially the same langauge as seen in Mill's three principles
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followers, however, have recognized the malleable nature of the concept
of harm. The initial appeal of the harm principle derives in part from the
empirical gloss normally accorded the concept. Theoretically, "harms" are
empirically verifiable injuries, observable conditions that are felt and that
can be quantified in some utilitarian sense.' The concept of harm, however,
cannot be reduced to a strictly physical, financial, or even a psychological
commodity.
One reason for this is that the concept of harm inevitably involves a
normative dimension. "Harm," properly understood, is a wrongful injury
or setback of interests.5 Non-wrongful injuries or setbacks to interest
are not harms, properly speaking. Persons may be injured or have their
interests thwarted in a litany of morally permissible ways. Examples
include when one person injures another in the course of self-defense;
when one person permissibly out-competes a second person for a prize
or a scarce commodity; when the harmed individual has consented to, or
assumed the risk of, an injury; and, when one person is justified in invading
the personal or property interests of another, as in cases of public necessity,
among others.16 Conversely, non-injurious wrongs are not harms.57 For
when he argued that the right to privacy encompasses three zones: first, a right to "autono-
mous control over the development and expression of one's intellect, interests, tastes and per-
sonality;" second, "freedom of choice in the basic decisions of one's life respecting marriage,
divorce, procreation, contraception, and the education and upbringing of children;" and, third,
"freedom to care for one's health and person, freedom from bodily restraint or compulsion,
freedom to walk, stroll, or loaf." Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 209 (1973) (Douglas, J., concur-
ring). Justice Douglas's concurrence was issued for both Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton.
54 See BENTHAM, supra note 20, at 29-30 (arguing that pleasure could be more or less
quantified along several different dimensions including its intensity, duration, certainty or
uncertainty, propinquity or remoteness, purity and extent-the number of persons to whom it
extends). Mill, famously, altered this by injecting a qualitative element, insisting that some
forms of pleasure are higher than others. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 11-12 (George
Sher ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1979) (1861).
55 See MILL, supra note 2, at 141 (concluding that we harm another when we invade the
zone of those interests which each of us has "either by express legal provision or by tacit un-
derstanding, [which] ought to be considered as rights").
56 The category of legal justifications in tort and criminal law represents one broad area
where one party is morally and legally justified in adversely affecting the interests of others.
But there are also many cases, including that of legitimate competition, where the winning
party is under no duty in the first instance to prevent "harm." Rather than viewing the con-
duct as justified, we view it as conduct which is in no way wrong in the first instance.
57 Feinberg provided the most comprehensive defense and application of the harm prin-
ciple in his four-volume series, THE MORAL. LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW. See I FEINBERG,
supra note 21 (concluding that the concept of harm is an amalgam of our concepts of inva-
sions of interests that amount to injury and acts that are moral wrongs). "Harm" involves
only setbacks of interests that are wrongs, and wrongs that are setbacks to interests. See id. at
31-37. Non-wrongful acts that set back another's interests, such as when one person fairly out
competes another, are not "harmful" in the relevant sense; nor are wrongs that do not cause
setbacks to another's interests, such as when an act that is intended to harm a person winds
up benefitting her. See id. at 35.
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example, breaches of a moral duty alone, absent an accompanying injury,
will generally not be considered "harm." 8 In sum, to be harmed, one must
be injured or have one's interests adversely affected (the objective aspect)
in a way that violates one's legitimate moral or legal claims (the normative
aspect).
Mill's appeal to harm, in other words, is not value-neutral, as he
implicitly recognized. 9 Thus, there is no purely objective concept of
harm to which we can appeal to tell us where to draw the line between the
private and the public realms. In order to draw this normative and legal
line, we must already have a background set of normative considerations
that guide our understanding of what it means for something to be "harm."
This observation has led some to contend that the concept of harm is
normatively circular and always potentially contestable.'
Yet, the problem is even worse for defenders of the harm principle since
it turns out that even the putatively objective aspect of our conception of
harm, the injury aspect, is not so purely objective after all. Our ideas of
what it means for something to be an injury often reflect a set of background
assumptions which are frequently philosophically controversial. Consider
the following two examples. First, is one injured by having one's character
morally corrupted? While classical philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle
assumed that this was indeed one of the gravest forms of personal injury,6'
and while the Judeo-Christian tradition has taken the same position,
6
58 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 902 cmt. a (1979) ("Damages flow from
an injury.").
59 See MILL, supra note 2, at 141.
60 See NEIL MCCORMICK, LEGAL RIGHT AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS IN LEGAL AND
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 29 (1982).
61 Aristotle taught that true human happiness, which the Greeks called "eudamonia,"
is only achieved by a life lived in accordance with virtue. In order to act virtuously, not only
must the agent do what is right, but, equally importantly, the agent "must be in a certain
condition when he does them: in the first place he must have knowledge; secondly he must
choose the [right] acts, and choose them for their own sakes; and thirdly his action must pro-
ceed from a firm and unchangeable character." ARISTOTLE, THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE
956 (Richard McKeon ed., 1941). The person who prevents another from developing a virtu-
ous character thereby undermines his chances for true happiness in the world. See PLATO, THE
COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 772-98 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1989)
(i96I) (describing different character types and their corresponding political constitutions).
Plato describes in book VIII of the Republic the way in which the moral decay of individual
character ultimately foreshadows the political decay of the state. Id.
62 One of the central teachings of the Christian tradition is that the mere outward obser-
vance of the Law without inner purity of soul is spiritually meaningless. This is the overriding
theme of Christ's "Sermon on the Mount." Matthew 5-7 (New American Standard). Moreover,
one who tempts others to moral corruption commits an unpardonable sin. "[Wihoever causes
one of these little ones who believe in me to sin, it would be better for him, with a heavy
millstone hung around his neck, he had been cast into the sea." Mark 9:42 (New American
Standard). Indeed, it is not going too far to say that, for devout Christians, there is a categori-
cal divide between moral and physical well-being such that all that can be gained physically
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some recent liberal theorists disagree. Legal philosopher Joel Feinberg
argued, for example, that moral corruption is not an injury to the person
who is corrupted if it does not affect his interests and life chances in the
world, and if he did not otherwise have an antecedent desire to avoid being
morally corrupted.63 The second example concerns whether the plaintiff
in a wrongful life case has been genuinely injured. Is one injured by being
born in a disabled state when the alternative is not having been born at all?
64
Whatever one's position on these issues, they make clear that even our
concept of injury frequently reflects a contestable normative stance which
will often be reflected in our notions about what constitutes a legitimate
state interest.
II. DEFINING THE SCOPE OF THE PRIVACY RIGHT IN THE
CONTEXT OF MORALS LEGISLATION
This section traces the contours of the modern privacy right and its
related doctrines. Specifically, it seeks to answer one particular question.
Does Supreme Court precedent establish a constitutional right to sexual
intimacy-a right that would given strict scrutiny protection to what we
might (hopefully not too euphemistically) refer to as "ordinary" forms of
traditionally unacceptable sexual activity, such as fornication and adultery?
We will focus on these two activities not only because they represent the
contemporary Maginot Line between liberals and conservatives concerning
morals legislation, but because they fall closest to the line, constitutionally,
suggested by Lawrence v. Texas.65 If non-marital and extramarital sex do not
fall within the ambit of constitutional protection, then it is unlikely that
other putatively "private" acts, like prostitution, are protected. Conversely,
if fornication and adultery statutes are now constitutionally suspect,
then what is next? This section argues that neither of these activities
are constitutionally protected under the strict scrutiny privacy right
jurisprudence, a conclusion that will lead us to consider, in the remainder
of the Article, under what circumstances these laws and other forms of
morals legislation will meet the kind of rational basis approach applied in
pales in comparison with moral and spiritual purity. "For what does it profit a man to gain the
whole world, and forfeit his soul." Mark 8:36 (New American Standard).
63 FEINBERG, supra note 2 1, at 65-70.
64 In the typical wrongful life case the fetus is born with some congenital disability that
has not been caused by any party. The "injury" is that he or she has been born at all in a
disabled state. See, e.g., Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 757 (N.J. 1984) (permitting recovery
for extraordinary medical expenses but not for the pain and suffering for having been born in
a disabled state).
65 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). While Lawrence was not decided on
strict scrutiny grounds, there is a good deal of ringing rhetoric that sounds as if the Court was
carving out a broad zone of personal liberty as against certain kinds of state interests enforced
under a rational basis review.
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Lawrence.
As various commentators have observed over the years, there are two
interpretations of the privacy right: an older idea that hews more closely to
the traditional meaning of "privacy" and a more recent notion that associates
the privacy right with a wider notion of personal autonomy.66 The older
idea is linked to various values protected at common law-the protection
of the home and of private places, 67 preservation of the autonomy of the
family,68 and common law protection, particularly under tort law, against
physical invasion of the body.69 The newer idea protects certain kinds of
activities because of their significance to the self, to one's life pattern, or to
one's sense of personal identity.7" It is this latter interpretation which most
closely approximates Mill's harm principle and which poses a fundamental
challenge to morals legislation.
Griswold v. Connecticut,71 the first case to recognize the privacy right,
explicitly followed the more conservative interpretation of privacy.7" The
Court in Griswold held that a Connecticut law which made it a crime to use
66 See Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1419-20 (1974);
Sandel, supra note 6, at 523-24; Gary Bostwick, Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose,
Sanctuary and Intimate Decision, 64 CAL. L. REV. 1447, 1448-49 (1976) (tracing three strands of
the concept of privacy). See also Roger Smith, The Constitution and Autonomy, 60 TEx. L. REV.
175 (1982).
67 These are values protected both by the Fourth Amendment and the older common
law right of repose in one's own home. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV; Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438,478 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (invoking "the right to be let alone"). See also
Bostwick, supra note 66, at 1449-50 (discussing the location-dimension of privacy).
68 A long line of cases have recognized a right of what might be called "family auton-
omy," a right to beget and to raise children without interference by the State. See Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (holding unconstitutional state law prohibiting the teach-
ing of a foreign language in public or private schools); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, z68 U.S. 5 1o,
534 (1925) (striking law prohibiting students from attending private schools); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972) (permitting Amish parents to withdraw children from school
after eighth grade). But see Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (rejecting Free
Exercise challenge to a law prohibiting children from publicly distributing literature).
69 See, e.g., Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914) (upholding battery
action for medical intervention performed without patient's consent); DeMay v. Roberts, 9
N.W. 146, 166 (Mich. 1881) (determining a battery action when consent to touch is obtained
fraudulently).
70 See June Aline Eichbaum, Toward an Autonomy-Based Theory of Constitutional Privacy
Beyond the Ideology of Familial Privacy, 14 HAv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 361, 365 (1979) (citing J.
Harvie Wilkinson, III & G. Edward White, Constitutional Protection for Personal Lifestyles, 63
CORNELL L. REV. 563,612 (1977)) ("The human dignity protected by the constitutional guar-
antees would be seriously diminished if people were not free to choose to adopt a lifestyle
which allows expression of their uniqueness and individuality."). See also John Lawrence Hill,
The Five Faces of Freedom in American Political and Constitutional Thought, 45 B.C. L. REV. 499,
561-79 (tracing the philosophical and constitutional development of the "self-individuating"
conception of freedom which is closely linked to autonomy).
71 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
72 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86 (1965).
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"any drug, medicinal article, or instrument for the purpose of preventing
conception" violated the privacy rights of married persons. 3 Griswold's
interpretation of the privacy right, as it emerged from the four distinct
opinions which thought the law violated the Constitution, was grounded
on an associational conception of privacy specifically limited to marital
association. 4 As such, it partook of the line of cases stretching back to
the Lochner era forty years earlier which recognized an important liberty
interest in the protection of decisions involving family privacy, particularly
ecisions regarding how one's children are to be raised and educated.7"
Griswold's version of the privacy right also concerned the place where
the activity occurred. Justice Douglas famously asked whether we would
have the police "search the sacred precincts of the marital bedroom for
telltale signs of the use of contraceptives."76 Thus, privacy protects some
of the same values as the Fourth Amendment. In fact, in his dissent in Poe
v. Ullman,77 a precursor to Griswold, Douglas specifically assumed that the
state could ban the sale of contraceptives, even though this would likely
create a greater barrier to access than a ban on their use. What the state
73 Id. at 480.
74 The final paragraphs of Justice Douglas's opinion asks whether the police can search
"the sacred precincts of the marital bedroom for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives"
and answers that this would be "repulsive" in a free society. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
Douglas continues:
Marraige is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring,
and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that pro-
motes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a
bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association
for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.
Id. at 486. Marriage, in sum, is more intimate, more private, and more fundamental to promot-
ing a way of life than these other kinds of associations. Douglas viewed privacy as an associa-
tional concept that had to do with the nature of the relationship between the participants in
being married to each other. Id.
Throughout the various other opinions, the Justices repeatedly invoked the right to pri-
vacy in marriage. See id. at 486-87 (Goldberg, J., concurring). The concurrence by Justices
Goldberg, Warren, and Brennan similarly referred to the right to privacy as "a right so basic
and fundamental and deep-rooted in our society as the right of privacy in marriage," and the
right to marital privacy and to marry and raise a family. Id. at 491,495. (Goldberg, J., concur-
ring). See also JOHN LAWRENCE HILL, THE POLITICAL CENTRIST (manuscript at 123-26 on file
with author) (Vanderbilt Univ. Press, forthcoming Oct. 2009) (criticizing the lack of coherence
among the various opinions in Griswold and the Court's inability to arrive at a shared constitu-
tional foundation for the right).
75 See Meyer v. Nebraska, z6z U.S. 39o, 399 (1923); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, z68 U.S. 510,
534-35 (1925); Wis c onsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972).
76 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
77 See Poe v. UlIman, 367 U.S. 497, 508-09 (Douglas, J., dissenting (1961) (decided four
years before Griswold, this case was dismissed for lack of standing when a Connecticut phar-
macist challenged the state's anti-contraception law).
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could not do, he argued, was ban their use-precisely because doing so would
"reach the point where search warrants [were] issued and officers appeared
in bedrooms to find out what went on. ' 78 Interpreted in this limited fashion,
the right to privacy was easily linked to the kinds of common law values
that accorded special protection to the home and to the family.
Griswold made clear, even as it protected a very traditional zone of
personal and familial liberty, that the Court had no intention of placing
in question the constitutional legitimacy of morals legislation. Justice
Goldberg's three-judge concurrence explicitly mentioned "what is
admittedly a legitimate subject of state concern-the discouraging of
extra-marital relations."79 The concurrence endorsed the "state interest in
safeguarding marital fidelity,"80 and announced that the constitutionality of
state statutes prohibiting adultery and fornication were "beyond doubt."'"
Justice Harlan, writing in Poe v. Ullman, similarly assumed that the state
has traditionally concerned itself with the moral soundness of its people
and openly assumed that there exists a strong constitutional presumption
favoring morals legislation.8" "I would not," wrote Harlan in Poe, "suggest
that adultery, homosexuality, fornication, and incest are immune from
criminal enquiry, however privately practiced."83 This followed his even
more explicit rejection of a Millian interpretation of the right to privacy:
Yet the very inclusion of the category of morality
among state concerns indicates that society is not limited
in its objects only to the physical well-being of the
community, but has traditionally concerned itself with
the moral soundness of its people as well. Indeed to
attempt a line between public behavior and that which is
purely consensual or solitary would be to withdraw from
community concern a range of subjects with which every
society in civilized times has found it necessary to deal."
In sum, the GriswoldJustices envisioned no special constitutional barrier
to morals legislation. What troubled all of them was not the nature of the
state interest, preventing non-marital and extramarital sexual activity, but
78 Id. at 520.
79 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 498 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
8o Id.
81 Id.
82 Poe, 367 U.S. at 547 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("If we had a case before us which required
us to decide simply.., whether the moral judgment implicit in [this statute] was a sound one,
the very controversial nature of these questions would, I think, make us hesitate long before
concluding that the Constitution precluded Connecticut from choosing as it has ......
83 Id. at 552.
84 Id. at 545-46.
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the potentially invasive means chosen to effectuate this end.
Reacting to Griswold's narrow interpretation of the privacy right, liberals
insisted that privacy has nothing to do with where the activity occurs but,
instead, with the nature of the activity itself, such that privacy protects the
value of personal autonomy."5 Subsequent cases made tentative advances
in the direction of an autonomy-based conception of the privacy right.
In Eisenstadt v. Baird,8 6 the next major case after Griswold to implicate
privacy-related concerns, the Court held unconstitutional a law that
prohibited the distribution of contraception to unmarried persons.87
Eisenstadt accomplished considerably more than merely applying Griswold's
holding to unmarried persons. It endorsed, first, an explicitly individualistic
conception of privacy that did not depend upon marriage or, for that matter,
on any particular associational context. "If the right of privacy means
anything," wrote Justice Brennan, "it is the right of the individual, married
or single, to be free from unwarranted government intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child." 8 Even more importantly, in extending constitutional protection to
the distribution of contraceptives, Eisenstadt implicitly abandoned Griswold's
emphasis on the privacy of the bedroom.8 9 Though a ban on distribution
applies at the point of sale and would not threaten intrusion into the
"sacred precincts of the marital bedroom," Justice Brennan found the law
objectionable on the broader, autonomy-based ground that it interfered
with decisions involving "whether to bear or beget a child." 9
Justice Brennan's opinion in Eisenstadt might be read to announce a
general right of sexual autonomy. What is the point of protecting the right
of unmarried persons to use contraception, after all, unless it is to insulate
from legal proscription the sexual activity that leads to its use? Eisenstadt,
however, does not stand for any of these propositions and carries little
85 This conception of personal autonomy is associated with a Kantian approach to meta-
ethical theory. The liberalism of two of the most important recent political thinkers, (the
early) John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin, among others, are both based on a Kantian approach
to political and legal theory. See RAWLS, supra note 20, at 450-56 (explicating a modern lib-
eral or neo-Kantian conception of autonomy). Legal scholarship examining or defending the
link between the right to privacy and personal autonomy is a veritable growth industry. See
RICHARDS, supra note 25, at 8-9 (defending a very broad Kantian understanding of personal
autonomy); Henkin, supra note 66, at 1418-i9; Smith, supra note 66, at 189-9o; J. Harvie
Wilkinson, III & G. Edward White, Constitutional Protection for Personal Lifestyles, 63 CORNELL
L. REV. 563,612 (1977). See also Eichbaum, supra note 7o.But see MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM
AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 1 (1982) (criticizing the "unencumbered" subject of neo-Kantian
political assumptions).
86 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
87 Id. at 44o.
88 Id. at 453 (emphasis added).
89 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
90 Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
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precedential value for any quasi-Millian interpretation of privacy. For one
thing, the quote purporting to declare a constitutional right of autonomy
in decisions concerning "whether to bear or beget a child" appears in
Justice Brennan's three-judge plurality opinion, an opinion that was joined
by concurrences which decided the case on different and much narrower
grounds.9'
Moreover, even Justice Brennan's plurality did not claim that the law
violated the right to privacy. As Justice Kennedy would do in Lawrence
thirty years later, the plurality opinion in Eisenstadt expounded on the
nature of the privacy right, but only to strike the statute under rational
basis review.9 No Justice thought the statute had to be reviewed under
the strict scrutiny standard. Furthermore, in using rational basis review,
the plurality never questioned the legitimacy of the state's ends, as Lawrence
did later.93 It assumed that the state's interest in deterring premarital
sexual intercourse was legitimate' but concluded that the means chosen
"prohibiting contraception" were not rationally related to that goal. 95 "It
would be plainly unreasonable," Justice Brennan wrote, "to assume that
Massachusetts has prescribed pregnancy and the birth of an unwanted child
as punishment for fornication." 96 The plurality, as such, did not insulate
non-marital and extra-marital sex from criminal sanction. Rather, it reached
the reasonable and substantially more modest conclusion that while the
state could prohibit adultery and fornication, it could not punish these acts
by preventing participants from protecting themselves from pregnancy and
sexually-transmitted diseases.97 Eisenstadt, in sum, followed Griswold in
limiting the permissible means by which states could effectuate (what the
91 Eisenstadtwas a 3-3-1 opinion overturning Baird's conviction for distributing a contra-
ceptive device to a woman after a lecture. Four Justices voted to strike down the law. Justices
Marshall and Stewart joined Brennan's plurality opinion holding that the law could not be sus-
tained on rational basis review. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 447 (3-3-I decision) (Brennan, J., plural-
ity). Justice Douglas concurred on First Amendment grounds. Id. at 447 (Douglas, J., concur-
ring). Justices White and Blackmun concurred but did not find the law unconstitutional. They
concluded that the record did not establish whether the recipient of the contraceptive was
married or unmarried and, consequently, overturned the conviction under Griswold. Id. at 465
(White, J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger dissented. Id at 465-71 (Burger, J.,dissenting).
Justices Powell and Rehnquist did not take part in the opinion. Id. at 465.
92 See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 443.
93 Id. at 453. The plurality did not determine whether the use of contraceptives by un-
married persons was immoral in itself, although that question was raised at the lower level.
94 Id. at 448. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated in an opinion almost
a century ago that the "'plain purpose is to protect purity, to preserve chastity, to encourage
continence and self-restraint, to defend the sanctity of the home, and thus to engender in the
State and the nation a virile and virtuous race of men and women."' Id. (citing Commonwealth
v. Allison, i16 N.E. 265, 266 (1917)).
95 Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 448.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 448-50.
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Court assumed was) their legitimate interest in preserving morality.
In Carey v. Population Services,98 decided just a few years later, the Court
struck down a law prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to minors
and limiting in various other ways, minor access to contraception. 99 Justice
Brennan again wrote a plurality opinion which, in various ways, would have
extended the reach of the privacy right had it garnered a majority. Using
strict scrutiny,' Brennan concluded that the right to privacy protected
minors, though he also acknowledged the state had wider latitude in
regulating the activity of minors.10 1 The opinion explicitly distanced itself
from Griswold's narrow reading of the privacy right:
Griswold may no longer be read as holding only that a State
may not prohibit a married couple's use of contraceptives.
Read in light of its progeny, the teaching of Griswold is
that the Constitution protects individual decisions in
matters of childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the
State. 0
For the first time, this opinion explicitly linked privacy to the value
of personal autonomy.03 It noted, more provocatively, that "[wihile the
outer limits of this aspect of privacy have not been marked by the Court,
it is clear that among the decisions that an individual may make without
unjustified government interference are personal decisions relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing
and education."104
The plurality's conception of privacy in Carey used the term "autonomy"
but specifically limited this to matters involving reproduction and the
family,05 and even this limited privacy right analysis never received
majority backing. The moderates, Justices White and Stewart, dismissed
as "frivolous" the argument "that a minor has the constitutional right to
put contraceptives to their intended use"'' 1 and were more concerned,
98 Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
99 Id. at 701--02. The law prohibited the sale of contraceptives to anyone under the age
of 16, required that only pharmacists could distribute contraception, and prohibited advertis-
ing. Id. at 681. The defendant was an out--of-state mail-order distributor of contraceptives.
Id. at 68z.
ioo Id. at 688.
ioi See id. at 695 n.17.
102 Id. at 687.
103 See id. ("[Slubsequent decisions have made clear that the constitutional protection
of individual autonomy in matters of childbearing is not dependent on [the privacy of married
couples in the home].").
104 Id. at 684-85 (citations omitted).
105 Seeid. at 687.
io6 Id. at 702-03 (White, J., concurring); Id. at 713 (Stewart, J, concurring).
[Vol. 98
MORALS LEGISLATION
as they were in Eisenstadt, with the punitive effects of anti-contraception
laws. Likewise, Justice Powell denied that minors' contraception use was
protected as a constitutional right"0 7 and concurred with the plurality on
narrower grounds. 108 Justices Stevens and Powell also specifically endorsed
the developmental and moral interests ofthe state in discouraging intercourse
among unwed minors."' 9 In sum, Casey only marginally expanded privacy
right protection and certainly never placed in question the legitimacy of
the state interest in preserving the morality of its citizens."0
The most important privacy right decision, Roe v Wade,"' was in
one respect only an extension of the logic of its precursors, Griswold and
Eisenstadt. To the extent the Constitution insulates from state interference
the decision "whether to bear or beget a child," abortion laws fall under
the same principle as anti-contraception laws.1 2 Indeed, there is a strong
argument that the kinds of interests protected in Roe fall even closer
to the heart of the old common law conception of privacy than those
involved in Griswold. Abortion rights raise, in a much more palpable way
than contraception, the importance of a general right of bodily integrity,
particularly in medical matters,"3 which connects the right to the kinds of
tort interests traditionally protected in the sphere of medical decisions."
4
Under this approach, if abortion rights are controversial at all, it is not
107 See id. at 705 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring).
io8 Id. at 707-08 (Powell, J., concurring). In Carey, Justice Powell concluded that the law
violated the rights of married persons under the age of i6 (marriage was legal in New York
at 14) and violated the constitutional rights of parents to distribute contraceptives to their
children while also agreeing that the First Amendment prohibited the advertising provisions.
Id. at 711.
IO9 Id. at 709 ("The State justifiably may take note of the psychological pressures that
might influence children at a time in their lives when they generally do not possess the ma-
turity generally to understand and control their responses. Participation in sexual intercourse
at an early age may have both physical and psychological consequences .... Moreover, society
has long adhered to the view that sexual intercourse should not be engaged in promiscuously,
a judgment that an adolescent may be less likely to heed than an adult.").
i o See id. at 707-08 (Powell, J., concurring and providing the fifth vote for the majority).
As a result, Griswold's reach was extended to married minors and held that parents who wished
to distribute contraceptives to their children were also protected by strict scrutiny. Id.
I i i Roe v. Wade, 41O U.S. 113 (1973).
i IZ In Roe, the Court reiterated that previous decisions "make it clear that the right has
some extension to activities relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relation-
ships, and child-rearing and education." Roe, 410 U.S. at 135 (internal citations omitted).
113 See Roe, 430 U.S. at 145-46 (noting that important medical and psychological inter-
ests would be affected if abortion rights were foreclosed).
114 See Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 128-29 (1914) (Cardozo, J.,
authored the majority opinion); Philip B. Heymann & Douglas E. Barzelay, The Forest and the
Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its Critics, 53 B.U. L. REV. 765, 775 (1973) ("The question of consti-
tutionality is a more difficult one than that involved in Griswold and Eisenstadt only because
the asserted state interest is more important, not because of any difference in the individual
[constitutional] interests involved.").
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because of the nature of the liberty interest, but because of the significance
of the countervailing state interest in protecting fetal life.
Taken together, however, Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe are often read
as recognizing a right "not to procreate," which compliments the right to
procreate recognized in Skinner v. Oklahoma."5 In fact, in one respect, the
right to have an abortion potentially implies a right even more expansive
than anything required by the capacious logic of the harm principle. One
of the most famous defenders of abortion rights has argued that abortion is
grounded on a right of bodily integrity or personal autonomy, which includes
a right to end the life of the fetus even if the fetus were considered a "third
party" within the meaning of the harm principle." 6 The right to abortion is
a right not to be an involuntary incubator for the benefit of a third party, the
fetus."7 In its most expansive incarnation, the right developed in Roe was
sometimes read as a general right of self-ownership which could include
a right of complete sexual autonomy,"' a right to assisted suicide,"9 and
even a right to use hard drugs privately.2 0
I 15 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 538 (1942) (holding unconstitutional a law that
required sterilization of those convicted three times of felonies involving moral turpitude).
116 See JUDITH JARVIS T IOMSON, A Defense of Abortion, in PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47-66 (1970
reprintedin THE ETHICS OF ABORTION: PRo-LIFE VS. PRO-CHOICE 241-256 (Robert E. Baird &
Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 200'). In her famous violinist example, Thomson argues that a
woman has no more of an obligation to save the fetus than a stranger would have to save a fa-
mous violinist who had been connected to her, without her knowledge or consent, for medical
reasons. Id. at 242. Just as the hapless stranger may disconnect herself from the violinist even
though the violinist will die, so a woman has the right to "disconnect" herself from the fetus.
Id. at 255. Of course, Thomson might argue that this does not really take the case outside of
the harm principle since, while the fetus may be assumed to be a third party, the person who
disconnects herself from the violinist is not really "harming" him (anymore than the failure to
rescue someone is harming them in the morally relevant sense). Id.
Of course, the Supreme Court held in Roe that the fetus is not a person for constitutional
purposes. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53. However, it does not necessarily follow from the fact that
the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment did not contemplate the status of the fetus that
it lacks the attributes of personhood in other respects and for other legal and moral purposes.
See FRANCES J. BECKWITH, DEFENDING LIFE: A MORAL AND LEGAL CASE AGAINST ABORTION
CHOICE 130-71 (2007) (arguing that the fetus has the essential attributes of moral personhood
from conception). See generally ROBERT P. GEORGE AND CHRISTOPHER TOLLEFSEN, EMBRYO: A
DEFENSE OF HUMAN LIFE 83-111 (2008) (defending the humanity and personhood of the early
embryo).
117 See Donald H. Regan, Re-Writing Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569 (1979); GEOFFREY
R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 851 (5th ed. 2009) ("[Sjelective cooption of human
bodies for the benefit of third parties would be unconstitutional even if those third parties are
human beings."). See also Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of
Abortion, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 480,482-85 (I990).
I18 In the fullest sense, this would mean that prostitution is also protected. See RICHARDS,
supra note 25, at 84-125.
I i9 See id. at 245-47.
120 See id. at 250. See also DAVID BoAz, LIBERTARIANISM: A PRIMER 79 (1997) ("The right
of self-ownership certainly implies the right to decide for ourselves what food, drink or drugs
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Each of these provocative interpretations has had its supporters; but
there has routinely been a stark ideological gap between the rhetoric
commentators and courts have used to describe the boundaries of the
right and the actual rulings. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,' for example,
Justice O'Connor provided the privacy right with its most ringing Millian
rhetorical cast:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central
to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the
heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept
of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could
not define the attributes of personhood were they formed
under compulsion of the State.' 2
Yet the Court's decisions have not lived up to the hype. Privacy may give
the individual the right to define his concept of the meaning of life, but it
apparently does not afford the individual the right to engage in a variety
of activities which would fall without question within the ambit of the
"personal" sphere protected by the harm principle.
Consider the basic right, implied by a robust interpretation of the
principle of self-ownership, 113 of terminally ill patients to enlist the help
of third parties to decide when to end their lives. Most recent defenders
of the right of personal autonomy have reasonably assumed that the "right
to die" must include a right to take active measures to end one's own life,
at least under certain circumstances.2 4 In Cruzan,2 5 the Court assumed
that there is constitutional protection for a competent patient to refuse
lifesaving medical hydration and nutrition' 6 but, seven years later, rejected
we will put into our own bodies.").
121 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
122 Id. at 851.
123 See BoAz, supra note 120 (discussing implications of the libertarian conception of
self-ownership). See also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923); Soc'y of the Sisters v.
Hill Military Acad., 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972);
Prince v. Massachuesetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944); Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 211
N.Y. 125, 129-31(1914); DeMay v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 16o, 166 (188i).
124 See, e.g., RICHARDS, supra note 25, at 245-47 (arguing for an unlimited right of
adults to end their lives as part of the right of autonomy); DEREK HUMPHRY, FINAL EXIT: THE
PRACTICALITIES OF SELF-DELIVERANCE AND ASSISTED SUICIDE FOR THE DYING 12-14 (1991) (ar-
guing that an individual facing death has a right to die).
125 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (199o).
126 Id. at 279.
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a constitutional right to assisted suicide in Washington v. Glucksburg.17 The
Cruzan Court had been willing to protect the same kinds of interests that
were protected by the tort actions for battery and for breach of informed
consent,"2 8 interests recognized in constitutional decisions dating back
more than a century.12 9 Nevertheless, the decision in Glucksberg reverted to
Justice Harlan's more conservative conception of due process, which limits
the scope of fundamental rights to activities which are "'deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition ...,,, and "'implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty."''" A right to assisted suicide was not among such
rights.
31
One seemingly benign implication of the harm principle is a right of
association that would include a right of unrelated persons to live together.
The Court, however, has limited heightened review protection only to the
extended family. In Moore v. East Cleveland,3 3 a four-member plurality
concluded that a local ordinance, which prohibited a grandmother from
living with her son and two grandchildren violated the Due Process Clause.
(The grandchildren were first cousins, each being separately descended
from the grandmother's two sons.)' 34 "Our decisions establish," Justice
Powell's plurality opinion declared, "that the Constitution protects the
sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is
deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."'
13
1
Other cases, however, have refused the invitation to apply a broader rubric
of intimate association to extend constitutional protection for cohabitation
in non-familial relationships. For instance, in Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 3 6 the Court upheld an ordinance which prohibited cohabitation
among persons who were not related by marriage, blood, or adoption.'37 As
127 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997).
1z8 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269 (quoting Schloendorff v. Soc'y of the N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E.
92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)). ("Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to deter-
mine what shall be done with his own body" in medical matters.").
129 See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 37-38 (1905) (upholding smallpox
vaccination requirement against due process challenge). The Jacobson Court recognized a
limited interest in declining a vaccination, balancing the liberty interest against the state's
interest in preventing the spread of disease. Id.
13o Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,503 (1977).
i31 Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,325 (1937)).
132 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728.
133 Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
134 Id. at 498-99.
135 Id. at 503. Justice Stevens, who provided the fifth vote, thought the ordinance was a
"taking" of property. Id. at 521 (Stevens, J., concurring).
136 Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
137 Id. at 8-9. But see Moore, 431 U.S. at 498 (distinguishing Boraas on grounds that Belle
Terre's ordinance expressly exempted all persons related by blood, adoption or marriage).
[Vol. 98
MORALS LEGISLATION
the Court declared in Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees,138 the "relevant limitations on
the sort of relationship ... entitled to some sort of constitutional protection
are those that attend the creation and sustenance of a family-marriage,
childbirth, the raising and education of children, and cohabitation with
one's relatives." 139 Those looking for constitutional protection for adultery
and fornication laws will find little solace in any of these decisions.
Heightened review has similarly been used to extend constitutional
protection to various aspects of marriage, procreation, and parenting
along modestly liberal-centrist lines. There is now general recognition
of a constitutional right to marry which cannot be restricted on the basis
of race,1" or because marriage license applicants have fallen behind
on child support payments,1 4' or even because one of the spouses is a
prison inmate. 41 On the other hand, those state courts that have found
constitutional protection for gay marriage have typically done so on rational
basis grounds under the Equal Protection Clause of the state or federal
constitution. 43  There is no constitutional protection whatsoever for
polygamous marriage' 44 and the Court has never explicitly stated that the
right to divorce is fundamental.1 41 Similarly, while there is protection for
the right to procreate,' 46 the procreative right certainly does not guarantee
138 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
139 Id. at 6I9.
140 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding unconstitutional anti-miscege-
nation statutes using strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause).
141 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387-92 (1978) (applying strict scrutiny to
hold unconstitutional, under a hybrid equal protection-fundamental right to marry analysis,
Wisconsin's requirement that those seeking marriage licenses present a judicial order showing
that they are current on child support).
142 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987) (following the Court in Zablocki in holding
unconstitutional a prison regulation that denied inmates the right to marry unless the super-
intendent found a "compelling" reason to grant permission).
143 See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941,961 (Mass. 2003).
144 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1879) (upholding bigamy conviction
of a Mormon against a free exercise challenge).
145 See Leonard P. Strickman, Marriage, Divorce and the Constitution, 22 B.C. L. REV. 935,
985 (198 i)(examining the constitutional status of divorce). But see Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371, 38o-81 (1971) (holding unconstitutional, as applied to indigents, a court filing
fee for divorce). Boddie is best understood, however, as part of a line of cases that held that
fees could not be constitutionally charged to the indigents who are seeking to exercise basic
civil rights, particularly access to the courts. See Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663, 666 (1966) (protecting fundamental interest in voting by holding a poll tax unconstitu-
tional); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-19 (1956) ("[D]estitute criminals must be afforded
adequate appellate review as defendants who have enough money to buy transcripts [for such
review]."); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963) (holding that indigent criminal de-
fendants are entitled to assistance of counsel on their first appeal).
146 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding unconstitutional manda-
tory sterilization for three-time felons under a fundamental interests analysis).
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the procreator custodial rights.147
For those recognized as the legal parents of a child, there is heightened
due process protection against visitation claims by third parties 1, There is
also protection for the paternal rights of unwed fathers who have established
a relationship with their child;' 49 but there is no protection for those who
have failed to establish such a relationship within a reasonable time.150 Nor
is there any constitutional protection to preserve the paternal rights of men
who conceive children in adulterous relationships with married women,
even when they have established an emotional bond with the child. In
MichaelH. v. GeraldD.,15' the Court upheld a state presumption of paternity,
which recognized the mother's husband as the father of the child. 5 The
Court was particularly solicitous about safeguarding the state's interest in
protecting the integrity of couples who have re-committed themselves to
their marriage after an adulterous affair from the potentially destructive
147 For a more exotic application of this rule, see Jordan C. v Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530,
533 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a sperm donor in an artificial insemination arrangement
is permitted a right to visit but not a right to custody).
148 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69 (2000). In Troxel, the Court held that the
Due Process Clause protects "the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning
the care, custody, and control of their children." Id. at 66. The Court also held that the federal
constitution requires "at least some special weight to the parent's own determination." Id.
at 7o . As such, under a strict scrutiny analysis, the Court invalidated a law which permitted
courts to grant child visitation to third parties whenever it was in the best interests of the
child.
149 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,658 (1972) (holding that the state could not termi-
nate the parental rights of an unwed father who had lived with his children and their mother
before the mother's death). See also Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,391-94 (1979) (invali-
dating on equal protection grounds, a statute which permitted an unwed mother but not un-
wed father to object to the adoption of a child by mother's new husband). Notably, in Caban,
the father maintained joint custody of the children. Id.
150 See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255-256 (1978) (holding that there was no
heightened protection for biological father to object to the adoption of a child by the mother's
husband under equal protection or due process when unwed father has failed to establish a
relationship with child); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248,261 (1983) ( holding the same). The
Lehr Court explicitly spelled out the moral underpinnings of heightened constitutional pro-
tection for the parental rights of unwed fathers:
The significance of the biological connection is that it offers
the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to
develop a relationship with his offspring. If he grasps that oppor-
tunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's
future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship.
... If he fails to do so, the Federal Constitution will not automati-
cally compel a State to listen to his opinion of where the child's
best interests lie.
Id. at z62.
151 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. i io (1989).
152 Id. at I 19-20.
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effects of regular visitation by the child's biological father. 113
Collectively, these decisions give little aid or comfort to those advancing
the notion that there is now heightened constitutional protection for even a
more limited right to engage in non-marital or extramarital sexual relations,
let alone a general right of sexual autonomy. Indeed, one post-Lawrence
federal circuit has rejected a constitutional challenge to a ban on the sale
of sex toys, specifically holding that there is no general constitutional right
to sexual autonomy, even among consenting adults in the privacy of the
bedroom.'" Outside of the context of contraception and abortion, no behavior
targeted by morals legislation has been protected under any form of heightened
constitutional review. If morals legislation is now moribund, as some liberals
and some conservatives have claimed,' it must be under the kind of
rational basis review employed in Eisenstadtv. Baird,"s 6 Romerv. Evans,'57
and Lawrence v. Texas.' It is to this issue that we now turn.
III. MORALS LEGISLATION AND THE PROBLEMS OF RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW
For those activities which do not fall within the ambit of a particular
constitutional right, the appropriate standard to evaluate the constitutionality
of a law is rational basis review.'59 Rational basis review requires that, in
order to justify challenged legislation, the state must demonstrate that the
law is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. In other words,
the purpose, end, or object of the law must be appropriate, permissible,
and legitimate, and the means chosen to effect this end must have some
empirically demonstrable relationship to (it must go some way toward
achieving) the end. Consider the following contemporary examples of
morals legislation and their corresponding state interests.
Prostitution. Laws prohibiting prostitution must bear a rational
relationship to any of the following state interests: protection of marriage
153 Id. at 129.
154 See Williams v. Att'y Gen. of'Ala., 378 F3d 1232, 1238 (1 ith Cir. 2004). The Eleventh
Circuit held on review that the district court committed reversible error in concluding that the
Due Process Clause affords individuals the right to use various sexual toys. Id. at 125o. The
court was forthright in declaring that "Iflor purposes of constitutional analysis, restrictions on
the ability to purchase an item are tantamount to restrictions of the use of that item" and held
that there was no right to use sex toys, or even a general right of sexual autonomy, between
consenting adults. Id. at 1242. "The mere fact that a product is used within the privacy of the
bedroom, or that it enhances intimate contact, does not in itself bring the use of that article
within the right to privacy." Id. at 1241.
155 See supra notes 6-12.
156 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446-47 (1972).
157 Romer v. Evan, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
158 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
159 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631 (1996); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S.
453,462-63 (1981); U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. t66, 174 -175 (198o).
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or the traditional family unit, prevention of exploitation (usually of the
prostitute), prevention of "commidification" of the sexual relationship,
preventing the spread of sexually transmitted diseases, and the prevention
of secondary crime associated with prostitution. 16
Homosexual relations. These laws have frequently been justified on
the basis of the state interest in promoting a heterosexual sexual ethic,
preventing the spread of sexually transmitted diseases, including AIDS,
and preventing the corruption of youth.16" '
Fornication and adultery. Adultery and fornication laws have traditionally
sought to protect the integrity of the family unit by prohibiting extra-
marital or non-marital sex. They have also been justified on the grounds
of preventing the spread of sexually transmitted diseases and of limiting
the number of children born out-of-wedlock.
162
Assisted suicide. Laws prohibiting assisted suicide have generally served
at least four state interests: (1) the preservation of life and prevention of
suicide; (2) protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession
(e.g., preventing a blurring of the line between healing and harming); (3)
protecting vulnerable groups, including the elderly, the disabled, and the
poor from coercion, abuse, neglect, and discrimination; and (4) preventing
a "slippery slope" to the use of non-voluntary forms of euthanasia.
163
Bigamy and polygamy. Bigamy and polygamy laws have been predicated
on the state's interests in protecting the integrity of the traditional family
unit, preventing the debasement of men and the degradation of women,
and a more general social interest in limiting the development of what one
court referred to as a "despotic" and "patriarchal" family structure.
16 4
I6o See State v. Freitag, 130 P.3d 544, 546 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2oo6) (quoting State v. Taylor,
8o8 P.ad 314, 317 (Ariz. Ct. App. 199o)) (asserting that state interests include "prevention
of communicable disease, prevention of sexual exploitation and reduction of 'the assorted
criminal misconduct that tends to cluster with prostitution'); People v Williams, 811 N.E.2d
1197, 1198 (II1. App. Ct. 2004) (quoting People v. Johnson, 376 N.E.2d 381, 386 (Il1. App. Ct.
1978)) (stating that interests include "preventing venereal disease, cutting down prostitu-
tion-related crimes of violence and theft, and protecting the integrity and stability of family
life"); MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES, 132-36 (1996) (arguing that prostitu-
tion "commodifies" sexual relationships).
I6I See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (acknowledging that the Georgia
sodomy law was based largely on the majority sentiment that the act is immoral), overruledby
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
16z See Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367 (Va. 2005). The Supreme Court of Virginia held
unconstitutional the state's fornication statute at issue in Martin. The statute was based on
the interests in protecting public health and encouragement that "children be born into a fam-
ily consisting of a married couple." Id. at 370 (internal quotations omitted).
163 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731-35 (1997).
164 See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (189o) (stating that polygamy "tend[s] to destroy
the purity of the marriage relation, to disturb the peace of families, to degrade women, and to
debase men"), overuledon other grounds by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996). See also
Reynolds v United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165-66 (1878) (characterizing polygamy as an "offense
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Additionally, each of these prohibitions has frequently been justified as
a prohibition of acts which are contra bonos mores, immoral in themselves.
6
In other words, where the previous state interests posit some social malady
which these respective laws seek to prevent, they have also been justified
on the more abstract ground that they are intrinsically immoral activities.
Part A examines the substantial difficulties faced by those attacking the
"means" or the "rational relation" requirement on rational basis review.
Part B then examines the "ends" prong of the test.
A. The "Rational Relation" Test in Context
There are several recurring "means-related" objections to morals
legislation that are made in the legal and philosophical literature on the
topic:
1. The problem of over-broad and under-inclusive legislation.- Even when a
state interest may undoubtedly serve a legitimate public health measure,
such laws are likely to be vastly over- and under-inclusive. Consider
prohibitions of consensual homosexual relations justified on grounds of
preventing the spread of STDs, including AIDS. Although this is obviously
a legitimate (if not a compelling) state interest, a problem arises because
these laws are usually grossly over- and under-inclusive. One commentator
has argued that public health justifications for sodomy laws fail to recognize
that while the largest number of AIDS cases in the U.S. affects homosexual
men, intravenous drug users are becoming the fastest increasing group of
victims of HIV and AIDS.'66 Moreover, these laws affect lesbians as well,
who account for a minuscule number of AIDS cases. 167 In other words,
sodomy statutes are vastly under-inclusive (to the extent that AIDS is
spread in other ways) and over-inclusive (to the extent that healthy gays
and lesbians are affected by these laws).
The same problem attends virtually all other forms of morals legislation
to the extent that they hinge on the state's interest in protecting public
health and safety. Laws prohibiting prostitution or fornication as an attempt
to prevent the spread of STDs, for example, will obviously be vastly over-
inclusive to the extent that most participants in these activities will protect
against society... [which] ... leads to the patriarchal principle, and which, when applied to
large communities, fetters people in stationary despotism").
165 This amounts to what Hart called "enforcing morality as such," regulating acts for
reasons that may have nothing to do with their social effects. HART, supra note 6, at 4.
i66 See Peter M. Cicchino, Reason and the Rule of Law: Should Bare Assertions of "Public
Morality" Qualify as Legitimate Government Interests for the Purposes of Equal Protection Review?,
87 GEO. L.J. 139, 152 (1998) (citing Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112, 124 (Mont. 1997)).
167 Cicchino, supra note 166 at i52 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 142 (1997)).
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themselves or will not otherwise threaten the spread of STDs. The same is
true of laws prohibiting drug use, which obviously prevent some who might
use marijuana or other drugs safely (over-inclusiveness), even as the laws
leave untouched the hazards of alcohol use (under-inclusiveness). Laws
prohibiting assisted suicide, which serve the interest of preventing the
potential abuse or coercion of the dying,168 will prevent some terminally ill
who are not coerced or abused from opting to end their lives. Similarly, if
adultery laws are justified as a means of preventing some divorces, many acts
of adultery do not lead to divorce, while many other unregulated conditions
do - an example of both over and under inclusiveness. These examples
could be multiplied indefinitely, but the point should be clear: many forms
of morals legislation are often highly over and under-inclusive.
The problem for challengers of these laws, however, is that rational basis
review is an incredibly deferential standard on the "means" requirement,
over- and under-inclusiveness ordinarily pose no difficulty for those who
want to see these laws upheld. 69 To be "rationally related" to its end, laws
must simply go some way toward advancing the legitimate state interest.170
States may adopt legislative schemes in furtherance of legitimate interests
which are far from perfectly tailored to meet the overall goal. Laws will
survive even when they are both over- and under-inclusive. 7 , As the
Court once put it, "The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the
classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the
State's objective."' 7 Just so long as their action is not arbitrary, legislatures
must be free to draw hard lines between different activities when doing so
advances a legitimate goal.'73
Moreover, laws may address a problem a step at a time by, for example,
regulating one activity while leaving a closely-related activity untouched.
"It is no requirement of equal protection that all evils of the same genus
be eradicated or none at all."' 7 4 States can, for instance, attack the spread
of STDs by targeting those types of acts among the most likely to spread
these conditions even if they do not reach all such harm-producing
i68 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 732.
169 See U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. i66, 174-75 (i98o); New York City Transit
Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 592-93 (1979); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88
(1955).
170 See Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. io6, I Io (1949).
171 See Beazer, 44o U.S. at 592-93 (1979) (upholding a blanket ban on the employment of
methadone users to further state interest in ensuring safety of the transit system's riders even
though methadone users could have filled non-safety related jobs).
172 McGowan v Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,425 (1961) (emphasis added).
173 In Fritz, Congress sought to eliminate "dual benefits" under Social Security and the
Federal Railroad Retirement Act among those who had worked for the railroad between ten
and twenty-five years. The law retroactively rescinded the benefits of those who no longer
worked for the railroad. Fritz, 449 U.S. at 175-79.
174 Ry. Express Ageny, 336 U.S. at 1 10 (1949).
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activities. Thus, for all practical purposes, objections from the under- and
over-inclusiveness of these regulations will seldom be constitutionally
availing.
2. Theproblem of empirical disagreement.- In addition to the problems related
to the "fit" between a state's purpose and the means it employs, other more
overtly empirical issues arise on rational basis review.
In passing morals legislation, legislatures must answer two distinct
questions which are usually submerged in the discussion of the means
requirement. A law can only be rationally related to a given end or purpose if
two conditions are met. First, the social evil which the law seeks to prevent
(or the good which it seeks to further) must be traceable to the regulated
activity and, second, regulating the activity must actually redress the social
evil (or promote the good) which constitutes the statute's purpose. 7 ' For
example, anti-prostitution laws which have as their purpose the protection
of the traditional family unit may fail to achieve this end in either of two
ways. First, prostitution may pose no threat to marriage since there may
be no causal relationship between the availability of prostitution and the
stability of marriage (because, for example, those who use prostitutes may be
no less likely to avoid marriage or get divorced than those who do not.) This
is the problem of traceability. Second, even if there is a link between the
availability of prostitution and the breakdown of the family unit (however
this may be measured), it may turn out that prohibiting prostitution does
little to redress the problem because prostitution may be difficult to deter.
Deterrence issues involve the problem of redressabilityY6
Problems of traceability involve some of the most hotly contested
empirical disputes. For instance, does gay adoption pose a genuine
psychological risk to the adopted child? Do polygamous relationships
tend to degrade women or have a deleterious psychological affect on the
self-esteem of the polygamist's wives? Does habitual marijuana use tend
to degrade the long-term capacity of users to work? Are men who frequent
prostitutes or read pornography statistically more likely to abuse their wives?
Will permitting assisted suicide lead to a "slippery slope" devaluation of
human life? These issues all involve empirically controversial premises
that a particular activity will lead to a specific social harm which are usually
disputed by opponents of morals legislation.
Again, however, modern rational basis cases have developed an
approach that is highly deferential to these kinds of laws. The Supreme
175 These two aspects of the means requirement parallel the traceability and redress-
ability conditions for the "standing" doctrine. To have standing, a plaintiff must suffer an
injury in fact, the injury must be traceable to the defendant's conduct, and a favorable court
decision must be able to redress the harm. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
56o-61 (992).
176 See infra Part III.A.3 (discussing deterrence issues).
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Court has made clear that "states are not required to convince the courts
of the correctness of their legislative judgments."'77 A law will not be
considered irrational as long as "it is evident from all the considerations
presented ... and those of which we may take judicial notice, that the
question is at least debatable."' 7 8 Furthermore, "litigants may not procure
invalidation of the legislation merely by tendering evidence in court that
the legislature was mistaken." 17 9 States may take one side of any empirical
debate (e.g., whether the issue is the claimed harmfulness of gay adoption
or the putative effects of prostitution on marriage) as long as there is some
evidence to support their side. Only if no evidence can be marshaled to
support an empirical claim will courts determine that there is no rational
relationship between the law and its purpose. 18  This obviously gives
the state a powerful advantage in litigation over laws regulating these
activities.
3. The problem of deterrence.- One version of the redressability problem
involves difficulties with deterring certain behavior. Even where a specific
harm is linked to a prohibited activity, there may be little the law can
do to deter these actions. Since at least the eighteenth century, one of
the most oft-cited arguments against morals legislation is that they are
often inefficacious because such laws fail to deter the types of activities
they target.'8' Morals laws may not deter some conduct for two different
177 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (i981). Challengers had
adduced significant evidence at trial that paperboard products were environmentally more
unsound than plastic. Id. at 460.
178 Id. (quoting United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938)).
179 CloverLeaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. at 464.
i8o In Carolene Products, the Court stated that "[wihere the existence of a rational basis
for legislation whose constitutionality is attacked depends upon facts beyond the sphere of
judicial notice, such facts may properly be made the subject of judicial inquiry... and the
constitutionality of a statute predicated upon the existence of a particular state of facts may be
challenged by showing to the court that those facts have ceased to exist." Carolene Products,
304 U.S. at 153 (internal citations omitted). More recently, the Justices have differed about
how much deference this requires exactly. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450
U.S. 662 (198o) (holding, in a Commerce Clause challenge, that the state's empirical claims
may be challenged at trial). In Kassel, Justice Brennan argued for a more deferential standard
saying, "The courts are not empowered to second-guess the empirical judgments of lawmak-
ers concerning the utility of legislation." Id. at 679 (Brennan, J., concurring). Courts have
more recently permitted challengers of a law to produce evidence that there is no empirical
connection between the means chosen and the ends. For example, in Romer, the trial court
rejected the claim that the state amendment rescinding civil rights protection for gays pro-
tected children. See Evans v. Romer, No. 92 CV 7223, 1993 WL 518586, at *9 (Colo. Dist. Ct.,
Dec. 14, 1993).
181 Bentham described several classes of "cases unmeet for punishment." Included
among these are cases where "punishment is groundless" (because the individual is unable
to forbear from doing the act) or where "punishment is unprofitable" (because too great a
punishment would be necessary to deter it). See BENTHAM, supra note 2o, at 170-75.
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reasons. One argument, popular since the eighteenth century, is that some
acts cannot be deterred because they satisfy deep-seated human needs."'
Prostitution, the "world's oldest profession," provides a paradigm of this,"s
but the argument has been made in other contexts.I8 4 Another argument is
that many of the kinds of activities prohibited by morals legislation, from
illicit sexual acts to illegal drug use, cannot be deterred because they take
place in private and are not easily detected. From Bentham's time to our
own, these two arguments have provided a mainstay of the utilitarian case
against morals legislation. 8 -
While there is undoubtedly something to these arguments, it remains
an empirical question whether (and to what extent) law can deter particular
activities. It is certainly arguable that the threat of prosecution deters a
certain percentage of private activity. While the argument that a law does
not deter may be sufficient to raise constitutional issues at a heightened
level of review, again, the deferential rational basis standard provides little
solace to those who challenge morals laws. Legislatures may employ
whatever means they deem necessary to prevent a recognized social evil so
long as it is at least debatable that laws may deter these activities to some
extent.
The same response applies to one other important utilitarian objection
frequently made to morals legislation. Limited-government utilitarians
typically argue that legalization of an activity is a better way to prevent
certain evils than criminalization. 186 Advocates of drug legalization often
argue that decriminalizing drugs would lower their costs dramatically,
182 See id. See also VON HUMBOLDT, supra note 26, at 71-81.
183 See Lars 0. Ericsson, Charges Against Prostitution: An Attempt at a Philosophical
Assessment, 90 ETHICS 335, 357-61 (1980) (arguing that it is pointless to criminalize prostitu-
tion because it is practically undeterrable).
184 Seee.g., LESTER GRINSPOONAND JAMES B. BAALAR, PSYCHEDELIC DRUGS RECONSIDERED
238-90 (1979) (examining the productive ways in which psychoactive drugs may alter the con-
sciousness).
185 As H.L.A. Hart notes in another context, deterrence is a function of the likelihood
of punishment. Acts which are not likely to be detected or prosecuted are less likely to be
deterred by legal sanction. And when the activity itself is such that participants are strongly
motivated to engage in the act, it will be all the more difficult to deter. H.L.A. Hart, Murder
and the Principles of Punishment: England and the United States, in PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 78 n.43 (1968).
186 In this sense it is argued that regulation, rather than prohibition, will better be able to
control certain activities rather than "drive them underground." See Ericsson, supra note 182,
at 352. The benefits include "freedom" gains when those who would otherwise be prevented
from engaging in the act are now able to do so, social gains from the reduction of interdiction
and prosecution costs, as well as permitting increased control of the harms associated with a
regulated activity. These arguments have been made frequently in the debate concerning the
criminalization of prostitution. Indeed, the authors of the Wolfenden Report found regula-
tion far superior to criminalization on these grounds. See WOLFENDEN REPORT supra note 6,
at 155-59.
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undercut drug-related violence, and permit the regulation and taxation
of drug sales.'87 These, too, are the kinds of arguments best directed to
legislative bodies; the highly deferential structure of equal protection
review leaves courts unable to entertain them. Whether drug legalization
will reduce crime or undercut violence associated with drug cartels is an
empirical question left to the legislature, as are all of the related utilitarian
issues that would have to be considered (e.g., whether there would be a
corresponding spike in the public health effects of legalization in the event
that lower prices would draw more users into the market).
These principles evince why it is so difficult to attack laws which receive
rational basis review on the "means" requirement. It also makes clear
the obvious potential for abuse. Because legislatures can almost always
plausibly draw some (at least debatable) empirical connection between a
social evil and a particular activity, the state will usually have some prima
facie ground for regulation.
B. The Concept of a Legitimate State Interest
We must begin with a fundamental, though sometimes contested, truth
about the nature of the legitimate state interest requirement. A legitimate
state interest is simply a minimally permissible end orpurpose which motivates
legislative action. Either a state interest is or is not legitimate. This might seem
a prosaic truth, but it is occasionally claimed that courts should determine
whether a state interest is legitimate by weighing the state interest
against the strength of the individual's liberty interest. s1 8  This, however,
cannot be correct. If courts were engaged in a weighing of individual and
state interests at rational basis review, we should expect the same state
interest to be legitimate in one case (where the competing liberty claim
was less significant) and not legitimate in another (where the competing
liberty claim was weightier). Indeed, virtually any state interest might
be legitimate given a sufficiently weak countervailing individual liberty
187 See Ethan A. Nadelman, The Case for Legalization, in DRUG LEGALIZATION: FOR AND
AGAINST 19-23 (Rod L. Evans & Irwin M. Berent eds., 1992) (summarizing the argument
for the economic benefits of legalization); Gary S. Becker, Kevin M. Murphy & Michael
Grossman, The Market for Illegal Goods: The Case of Drugs, 114 POL. & ECON. 38, 40 (2006); See
also Milton Friedman, An Open Letter to Bill Bennett, in DRUG LEGALIZATION: FOR AND AGAINST
49 (Rod L. Evans and Irwin m. Berent eds., 1992). But see William J. Bennett, A Response to
Milton Friedman, in DRUG LEGALIZATION: FOR AND AGAINST 53 (Rod L. Evans and Irwin m.
Berent eds., 1992) (providing a classic exchange on the drug legalization issue).
188 Commentators have occasionally claimed that determining whether an interest is
minimally legitimate requires a utilitarian balancing of the individual's interests against so-
ciety's interest. See, e.g., Cicchino supra note 166. Peter Cicchino writes, for example, that
"equal protection review almost invariably involves some form of utilitarian analysis to en-
deavor to weigh and compare the competing interests of the government and those burdened
by the classification at issue. In this way, courts decide what qualifies as 'compelling,' 'sub-
stantial,' or even 'legitimate' .... " Id. at 146.
[Vol. 98
MORALS LEGISLATION
interest, an outcome that few would welcome. If the legitimacy of a state
interest were determined in this way, courts could never make a categorical
determination of the legitimacy of a particular state interest. Each case
would depend on the strength of the countervailing liberty claim. The
very structure of modern rational basis review rules out any such balancing
of individual versus state interests.1
9
When is a state interest affirmatively illegitimate? While racial
discrimination provides the paradigm example of an illegitimate state
interest in the context of heightened review,' 9° there are two categories
of impermissible purpose cases on rational basis review. The Supreme
Court has held, first, that it is not legitimate for states to provide differential
compensation to state residents based on their length of residence in a
state. 91 These cases are probably best understood as extending protection,
even on rational basis review, to the value of the inter-state right to travel
and the principle of non-discrimination against new residents. 19 A second
and, for our purposes, more important category involves cases in which the
Court has determined that a state's actual purpose was to disadvantage a
politically unpopular or otherwise vulnerable group.
In the Moreno case,' 93 decided in 1973, the Court held unconstitutional
a federal amendment to the Food Stamp Act, which prohibited unrelated
persons living together from receiving food stamps because it determined
189 This is what distinguishes modern rational basis review from the variety used, for
example, during "Lochner, Coppage, Adkins, Burns, and like cases...." Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372
U.S. 726, 730 (1963). The Court does not balance interests but, instead, tests to ensure that
the means is rationally related to the end. The test is not whether the ends justify the means,
but that the means are relevant to achieving a minimally permissible end. As Justice Black
commented in Ferguson, "Under the system of government created by our Constitution, it is
up to legislatures, not courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation. There was
a time when the Due Process clause was used by this court to strike down laws which were
thought unreasonable...." but this doctrine "has long since been discarded." Id. at 729-30.
19o See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-i (1967) (holding unconstitutional a
state anti-miscegenation statute on grounds that the state interests in "preserv[ing ... racial
integrity[,] ... prevent[ing] ... corruption of blood," and preventing the creation of a "mongrel
breed of citizens" were not permissible state ends. Id. at 7 (citations omitted).
191 See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 65 (1982) (holding that it is not permissible for a
state to apportion distributions from the state's oil resources based on the length of residence
in the state); Hooper v. Bernalillo County 472 U.S. 612, 623 (1985) (holding invalid a New
Mexico law which gave a $2000 tax exemption to military veterans only if they were living in
the state before a certain date); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 27 (1985) (holding uncon-
stitutional a tax credit for cars purchased in other states by state residents but denying it to
new residents).
192 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) (using strict scrutiny based on
the right to travel to invalidate one-year residency requirement for welfare recipients); Att'y
Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 904 (1986) (using strict scrutiny based on the right
of interstate migration to invalidate an employment preference limited to veterans who were
in-state residents at the time they entered military service).
193 U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
2009-201O]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
that the law was motivated by a bald desire to disadvantage hippies.' 94 A
little over a decade later, the Court held in City of Cleburnev. Cleburne Living
Center' that states and municipalities may not impose zoning burdens on
those who wish to open a home for the mentally disabled.' 96 More recently,
in Romer v. Evans, the Court held that states may not impose heightened
political obstacles on homosexuals as a class when the intent is to make
them "unequal to everyone else."'97 Together these cases stand for the
principle that it is not legitimate for the state or federal government to
express animus toward a vulnerable or unpopular group. Stated in a slightly
more expansive manner it can be said that while laws may check the effects
of bad behavior they may not impose obstacles based on a group's cultural or
political status.19 In the broadest sense, these cases involve the application
of the principle of non-discrimination on rational basis review.
Does Lawrence v. Texas now portend a third and much broader category
of cases: those in which the state attempts to advance morals-related
interests that do not rise to the level of a Millian harm? The following
section examines five such varieties of morality-related state interests that
have traditionally been recognized but are now shrouded in controversy.
IV. MORALITY AS A LEGITIMATE STATE INTEREST:
FIVE TYPES OF MORAL PURPOSES
A rigorously Millian concept of harm encompasses acts that directly and
wrongfully injure third parties."9 The following five species of justification
regulate on the basis of affects which are either not sufficiently direct (or
concrete) or are too generalized (such that they affect everyone generally,
but no one in particular, in a sufficiently palpable way) to constitute a
harm in the Millian sense. These include (1) regulating on the basis of the
secondary effects of self-regarding acts; (2) regulating offensive conduct;
(3) preventing "moral corruption" of individual character; (4) protecting
194 Id. at 534.
195 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 450 (1985).
196 Id. at 450.
197 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 62o, 631-36 (1996).
198 The Court has explicitly stated in other contexts that one's status can seldom, if ever,
be the basis for the imposition of criminal sanctions. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660,
666-67 (1962) (overturning on "cruel and unusual punishment" grounds a law that made it an
offense to be a drug addict). The Court's rationale was that offenses must involve specific acts
and that a person could not be convicted for the status of being an addict. Id. at 666; cf Powell
v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 532 (1968) (upholding conviction for public intoxication on grounds
that this involved the act of being publicly intoxicated).
ig9 Seesupra notes 16-24 and accompanying text (for a discussion of the harm concept);
infra notes 200-224 and accompanying text (distinguishing direct harm from indirect harm
and distinguishing harm from offense.) For a recent philosophical treatment of the concept of
harm, see FEINBERG, supra note 2 i.
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and fostering important social values and institutions; and (5) regulating
morality as such. As we progress through the list, the justifications grow
more controversial from a standard liberal perspective as the morals concern
becomes "purer" and less obviously tied to some direct, individualized
harm. As we will see, Mill himself made provision for some instances of
(1) and (2). Modern liberals usually go further, often embracing at least
some cases involving (3) and (4), while drawing the line at (5). This Article
contends that this gives moderate defenders of morals legislation all they
require to justify such laws.
A. The Secondary or Indirect Public Effects of Private Activity'00
When, if ever, should the state be able to regulate putatively private
behavior on the grounds that, in a certain percentage of cases, this behavior
leads to harmful public consequences? When, if ever, can private drug use
be prohibited on grounds that drug users tend to commit a higher rate of
crimes than others? Similarly, can prostitution be prohibited on grounds that
crime rates are higher around red light districts? True Millians are obviously
not opposed to punishing the harmful public effects of private acts, but it
is another matter to prohibit the private activity itself as a prophylactic
measure. Liberals face a dilemma in this regard. If they permit regulation
on the basis of the secondary public effects of private acts, there will be
little left of the harm principle, since self-regarding activities frequently
have public consequences. Gambling, drug use, prostitution, even some
consensual sexual acts such as adultery will each predictably have public
effects on crime, unemployment, or, in the case of adultery, consequences
for the structure of the family and the well-being of children. Yet if they
do not permit these kinds of regulations, social order will obviously be
imperiled as legislators are foreclosed from attacking the conditions that
give rise to these public harms.
Mill recognized the problem and, as a general matter, attempted to
maintain the separation between private acts and public consequences.
He argued that the harm principle usually sanctions punishment only for
200 We regulate on the basis of secondary effects when we prohibit one act in order to
prevent a second, distinct act (which usually involves harm to a third party). Examples in-
clude prohibiting drug use to prevent robbery (as when the user holds up a convenience store
owner to obtain cash to support his habit), or when the customer of a prostitute infects his wife
with an STD from the illicit arrangement. Yet it is not always clear whether laws are based on
the primary or secondary effects of an activity. For example, to prohibit homosexual activity in
order to prevent the spread of disease, the effect would be primary to the extent that we want
to protect the participants themselves but would be secondary to the extent that we want to
protect third parties (e.g., the wife of a covertly gay man). Similarly the "prevention of the
corruption of youth" rationale for homosexuality concerns the direct effects of homosexual
intercourse on children and adolescents. See CICCHINO, supra note i66, at 149 (characterizing
as secondary effects a range of effects some of which are primary or direct).
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the harmful public effects of private behavior, never for the private behavior
itselff201 Private drunkenness or even drug use should be beyond the reach
of the law, he argued, but when a policeman or soldier is drunk on duty
they can of course be punished. 02 At another point, however, he softened
his stand. He admitted that the risk of harmful public consequences could
sometimes be sufficient to regulate an activity, conceding that whenever
"there is a definite damage, or definite risk of damage, either to an individual
or to thepublic, the case is taken out of the province of liberty and placed in
that of morality or law.
'2 3
How definite must the risk of public harm be? Contemporary Millians
have frequently reverted to a utilitarian balancing formula. They permit
intervention when the gravity and the probability of potential harm
outweigh the infringement on the liberty interests of the individual .2 1
Yet, libertarians and other purer Millians may object that a utilitarian
balancing of the collective and individual interests violates the spirit of
the ethic of liberty. One person's freedom to act in a self-regarding way
should not be limited because another permits the consequences of his
own behavior to flow out into the public realm. Mill appears to have
been sympathetic to this objection and counseled a more individualistic
approach to the problem. Rather than prevent everyone from engaging in a
private activity because of the harmful consequences brought about by the
few, he preferred stronger responsive sanctions to the few whose behavior
results in the harmful public consequences. He advocated, for example,
that anyone who committed a violent act under the influence of alcohol
could forever be enjoined from drinking alcohol, with a severely increased
sanction for repeat offenders. 05
201 MILL, supra note 2, at 149.
202 Id.
203 Id. (emphasis added). The two emphasized portions indicate significant amend-
ments to the harm principle. In conceding that the mere risk of damage is enough, Mill
opened the door to quantitative assessments of potential harms and to utilitarian balancing of
harms against the social interests advanced by prohibition.
204 See Feinberg, supra note 21, at 191. Feinberg's formula is similar to the calculus
made famous by Judge Learned Hand in the U.S. v. Carroll Towing. Hand's formula generally
states that whether there is a duty in negligence cases is determined by whether the burden
of preventing a given harm is less than or equal to the probability of harm multiplied by the
gravity of the harm. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 Ed 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
In some cases, Feinberg notes, a licensing mechanism may be a better alternative to blanket
prohibition, on one hand, or permission, on the other. See Feinberg, supra note 21, at 194.
205 MILL, supra note 2, at 167. Mill even went so far as to argue that the State could
act in a prophylactic manner to prevent the potential secondary effects of certain personal
choices. For example, he argued that the right to marry may be denied to those who cannot
demonstrate that they can support a family-a conclusion which would strike many today as
profoundly "conservative" on grounds that it is better to severely limit the freedom of those
whose activities may have serious public costs or consequences than to limit everyone's free-
dom to engage in an otherwise self-regarding activity. Id. at 179; contra Zablocki v. Redhail,
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American law does not follow Mill's more individualistic approach. Laws
routinely regulate or even prohibit self-regarding acts on the basis of their
harmful secondary effects and most liberals today support this, distancing
themselves in this respect from Mill's individualism. As a constitutional
matter the Supreme Court has regularly and unequivocally upheld the
legitimacy, even the compelling need, for preventing secondary effects of
putatively self-regarding activities. In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slayton,2 06 the
Court upheld an injunction on the exhibition of obscene movies invoking
the local interest in addressing "the arguable correlation between obscene
material and crime," 07 and the "anti-social behavior" brought about by
"crass commercial exploitation of sex."118 Indeed, the Court cast these
secondary effects in the very generalized terms of upholding social order
and morality. States may legitimately judge whether "public exhibition of
obscene material, or commerce in such material, has a tendency to injure
the community as a whole, to endanger the public safety, or to jeopardize.
the States' right.., to maintain a decent society."'
Similarly, in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 10 the Court upheld a local
ordinance banning nude dancing. Justice Souter, who provided the fifth
vote, concurred not on the basis of the "sufficiency of society's moral
views to justify the limitations at issue, but on the State's substantial
interest in combating the secondary effects of adult entertainment
establishments.
'11 l
More recently the Court upheld a similar ordinance banning nude
dancing based on the asserted justification that "crime and other public
health and safety problems are caused by the presence of nude dancing
establishments." '  There is no serious doubt that, as a constitutional
matter, states may regulate private activities when the effects of these
activities affect the public in a certain proportion of cases.
B. Offensive Conduct
Offensive activity raises the example of the "concreteness" of harm.
434 U.S. 374, 390-91 (1978) (where the Court ruled that a state could not constitutionally
deny a marriage license even to a person who was already behind in child support payments).
Zablocki evinces the modern liberal shift away from imposing severe sanctions on weaker or
poorer members of society.
2o6 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slayton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
207 Id. at 58.
zo8 Id. at 63.
209 Id. at 69. (internal citations omitted).
21o Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (ig9i).
211 Id. at 582 (Souter, J., concurring). The other four justices went further, sanctioning
the power of the state to regulate on the basis of morality simplititer. See id. at 569, 580.
212 City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277,300 (2000); see also id. at 296.
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Since offense does not usually involve an invasion of a person's physical
or economic interests, it does not qualify as a true "harm" in the Millian
sense.2 13  At most, offense is an invasion of our sensory, emotional, or
dignitary interests-our interests in not being shocked, disgusted, "grossed
out," or humiliated.2 1 4 Perhaps because it represented an obvious extension
of his principle, Mill dealt obliquely with those "offenses against decency
upon which it is unnecessary to dwell" but stated unequivocally that the
prohibition of those activities is consistent with the harm principle.
2 15
No one has seriously cast doubt on the principle that states may
legitimately reach a variety of offensive behaviors and conditions.
Nuisance principles in tort and criminal law prohibit the invasion of various
generalized rights of a public nature or private rights to the owner's use and
enjoyment of his property.1
1 6
213 Offensive conduct is often wrongful, but it may not rise to the level of injury in the
Millian sense if it does not involve the kind of invasion of one's physical, emotional, or eco-
nomic interests as do genuine harms. Contemporary liberals follow Mill in holding that, while
offense is not harm in the strict sense, prohibition of offensive conduct is consistent with
liberal political commitments. Feinberg defines liberalism "as the view that the harm and
offense principles, duly clarified and qualified ... exhaust the class of morally relevant reasons
for criminal prohibitions." FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 14-15.
214 Joel Feinberg describes six varieties of offense in his harrowing "ride on the bus"
example. See 2 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: OFFENSE TO OTHERS
10-13 (1985). Feinberg asks the reader to imagine that they are on a bus when other passen-
gers engage in a variety of offensive, disgusting, or shocking behaviors of the six kinds. First,
there are assaults upon the senses, as when confronted with someone who has not bathed,
someone wearing violently clashing colors, or someone scratching their fingernails on a black-
board. Id. at IO. Second, acts which evoke disgust and revulsion in cases ranging from pas-
sengers who "scratch[], drool[], cough[], fart[], and belch[]" to passengers spreading out a
picnic lunch of insects, or, worse, passengers consuming each other's vomit. Id. at II. Third,
cases involving shock to our moral, religious or patriotic sensibilities: defiling corpses, using
the American flag to clean one's face after a messy lunch, a T-shirt depicting a crucified Christ
which says,"Hang in there baby," etc. Id. Fourth, behavior causing a mixture of shock and
embarrassment exhibited by a passenger openly masturbating on the bus. Id. Fifth, behaviors
evoking annoyance, boredom, or frustration, like your neighbor on the bus insisting on talking
to you even though you have signaled a desire to return to your book. Id. at 13. Sixth, mock-
ing behavior causing fear, resentment or humiliation exemplified by a passenger wearing a
swastika on his armband or a T-shirt reading "Keep bitches barefoot and pregnant." Id. Each
of these categories of offense infringe on our emotional sensibilities in different ways without
constituting a Millian harm.
215 See MILL, supra note 2, at 168. Additionally, Mill wrote that "there are many acts
which ... if done publicly, are a violation of good manners and, coming thus within the cate-
gory of offenses against others, may rightly be prohibited." Id. As Feinberg put it, after Mill's
"bold initial claim" that harm is the only basis for limiting liberty, he "comes to appreciate the
offense principle in a later chapter as a kind of afterthought." Feinberg, supra note 2 1, at 14.
216 Feinberg distinguishes nuisances from "profound offens[e]." See FEINBERG, supra
note 2I, at 50-57. The Restatement of Torts provides that a "public nuisance is an unrea-
sonable interference with a right common to the general public." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 821(B) (1979). It usually requires conduct that "involves a significant interfer-
ence with the public health ... safety ... peace ... comfort ... or convenience," and public
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While the Supreme Court has regularly extended constitutional
protection to putatively offensive speech under First Amendment
principles, 17 more serious forms of offensive conduct, such as indecent
exposure, engaging in sexual acts in public, and the improper treatment
of dead bodies, appear to be beyond constitutional question.118 States
may also legitimately express their disgust at a variety of other putatively
distasteful activities. For instance, the Seventh Circuit recently upheld
a law, prohibiting the sale of horse flesh for human consumption., 9 It
is important to note that the law did not prohibit killing horses and was
not justified on animal cruelty grounds.2 0 Rather, it was justified as the
expression of profound distaste directed at the human consumption of
horse meat."'1 As Judge Posner declared in his opinion:
[E]ven if no horses live longer as a result of the new law, a
state is permitted, within reason, to express disgust at what
people do with the dead, whether dead humans being or
dead animals .... A follower of John Stuart Mill would
disapprove of a law that restricted the activities of other
people . .. on the basis merely of distaste, but American
governments are not constrained by Mill's doctrine.22
While the offensiveness of an activity occasionally makes something
wrong, in other cases we find it offensive because we find it wrong.2 3 We
are offended at the idea of necrophilia, for example, because it offends our
nuisances are frequently criminal offenses. See id., cmt. d.; see also id. § 821(D) (providing a
discussion of private nuisance).
217 See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (overturning the conviction under
a statute punishing profanity of a man who wore a jacket with the words "Fuck the Draft"
emblazoned on it).
218 See MODEL PENAL CODE §251.1 (1962) (amended 198o) (misdemeanor prosecution
for "Open Lewdness," for "any lewd act which he knows is likely to be observed by others
who would be affronted or alarmed"). The mistreatment of dead bodies is more frequently
the subject of civil actions for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress. See
Gonzalez v. Metro. Dade County Pub. Health Trust, 651 So.2d 673, 675-76 (Fla. 1995) (re-
quiring plaintiff to show physical injury or willful or wanton conduct resulting from negligent
mishandling of a dead body); Christensen v. Superior Court, 8zo P.zd 181, 184 (Cal. 1991)
(mishandling of i6,ooo decedents).
219 Cavel Int'l, Inc., v. Madigan, 500 F3d 551, 559 (7th Cir. 2007).
220 See id. at 553.
221 Id. at 557.
222 Id.
223 See HART, supra note 6, at 43-44 (noting the distinction drawn in the criminal law
between immorality and indecency). "Sexual intercourse between husband and wife is not
immoral, but if it takes place in public it is an affront to public decency. Homosexual inter-
course ... is immoral according to conventional morality, but not an affront to public decency,
though it would be both if it took place in public." Id. at 45.
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deepest moral sensibilities about the proper treatment of human bodies.
We find the practice offensive because we understand it to be wrong. This
indicates not only that most will accept regulation of sub-harmful injuries,
but that people sometimes accept them primarily because of the moral
component. 1 4 This strongly suggests that most accept the protection and
cultivation of our moral sensibilities as a worthy justification for legislation
independent of harm prevention.
C. Preventing the Corruption of Moral Character
Should government play a role in fostering social conditions essential to
the development of the moral character of its citizens? While these functions
are seen as central to the conservative or communitarian conceptions of
society,2 5 it is frequently maintained that the liberal state can have no
role in value shaping, character formation, or even fostering conditions
conducive to the development of good moral character.2 16 Indeed, some
liberal philosophers have taken the extreme position that the corruption of
one's character cannot even be considered a cognizable harm to the person
who has not yet acquired a desire to be morally virtuous.2 7 Liberal political
philosophers have thus consistently rejected what we might call the "moral
educative" function of the law.2 '
224 Seesupra Part IV(B) for a discussion of the idea that law may prohibit acts on the basis
of their perceived immorality.
225 See, e.g., GEORGE F. WILL, STATECRAFT AS SOULCRAFT (1993) (arguing for a return to a
civic republican conception of self and politics); SANDEL, supra note 85 (critiquing the liberal
conception of the self).
226 Liberals are usually opposed to a role for the state in character shaping for a variety
of reasons. They may fear that when government is able to shape its citizens' values, this
comes too dangerously close to an Orwellian vision of totalitarianism. As Ronald Dworkin
put it, the core value of liberalism is that "government must treat all its citizens with equal
concern and respect" which requires, in turn, "that all political decisions must be, so far as is
possible, independent of any particular conception of the good life or of what gives value to
life." DWORKIN, supra note 2o, at 181, 19o-91. More commonly, however, giving the state a
role in shaping character is viewed to violate liberal neutrality and a Kantian conception of au-
tonomy, which requires that the person must choose his own ends in life. See GEWIRTH, supra
note 2o, at 32 (choices which are in any way shaped or compelled are not truly voluntary). The
state should have no role in influencing our moral choices and convictions. As Michael Sandel
argues, "For the liberal self, what matters above all, what is most essential to our personhood
is not the ends we choose, but our capacity to choose them." MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S
DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 12 (1996). Sandel quotes Rawls'
dictum: "'For the self is prior to the ends which are affirmed by it; even a dominant end
must be chosen from among numerous possibilities."' Id. (quoting JOHN RAWLS, A "IEORY OF
JUSTICE 56o (197 )).
227 See FEINBERO, supra note 2 1, at 68-70 (arguing that we cannot be harmed if we do not
have an antecedent desire to be morally good).
228 Like Mill, Hart was skeptical of the moral-educative function of law. Hart wrote,
"Much morality is certainly taught and sustained without [legal punishment], and when mo-
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Notwithstanding these oft-cited tenets of liberal political theory,
courts have routinely recognized the state's interest in protecting the
development of individual character, particularly among the young. These
interests were traditionally couched in such explicitly moralistic terms as
protecting the "purity" or "chastity" of those who have not yet reached
adulthood, preventing the corruption of youth, and, even more explicitly,
"encourag[ing] continence and self-restraint" and "engender[ing] in the
state and nation a virile and virtuous race of men and women.
2 2 9
Today, however, they are frequently cast in more modern psychological
or developmental terms. In Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser,30  for
example, the Court upheld the school-sanctioned punishment of a high
school student who gave a sexually explicit speech during a high school
assembly.23' In its opinion, the Court recognized the state's interest in
curbing offensive speech to a captive audience when it concluded that
"the speech was acutely insulting to teenage girl students. 232 The Court,
however, also invoked the state's interest in preventing developmental
harms to young students.233 States have an interest in protecting youth
from "speech [that] could well be seriously damaging to its less mature
audience, many of whom were only 14 years old and on the threshold of
awareness of human sexuality."' ' It firmly underwrote the school's function
as an instrument of moral education, declaring that schools "may determine
that the essential lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a
school that tolerates lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and conduct such
as that indulged in by this confused boy."3 '
Recent commentators who support a quasi-Millian ban on all forms
of morals justifications have interpreted Fraser's more developmental
or psychological gloss on the state's interest as evidence that courts are
abandoning morals-based justifications and limiting constitutional validity
to harm-based justifications . 3 6 But there are several problems with this
rality is taught with it, there is the standing danger that fear of punishment may remain the
sole motive for conformity." HART, supra note 6, at 58.
229 See Commonwealth v. Allison, i16 N.E. 265, 266 (1917).
23o Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
231 Id. at 685-86.
232 Id. at 683.
233 The Court recognized "the obvious concern on the part of parents, and school au-
thorities acting in loco parentis, to protect children-especially in a captive audience-from ex-
posure to sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech." Id. at 684.
234 Id. at 683.
235 Id.
236 Goldberg argues, for example, that "morality-inspired government action [is permis-
sible] only when it is supported by reference to empirical or otherwise demonstrable harms."
Goldberg, supra note 6, at 1240. Goldberg strains throughout the article to distinguish the
more "empirical" public welfare concerns from abstract, philosophical arguments supporting
morals legislation. Id. at 1238-4
o
, 1307.
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view. First, it is at least debatable whether there is a real harm in the
Millian sense when an individual hears sexual information at a point in
youth before he or she should otherwise be exposed to such information.
It is not clear how this "harms" the individual-at least not in Mill's sense.
More importantly, it is certainly arguable that we are simply repackaging
our older "moral" vocabulary in more modern, empirical-sounding
psychological terms.
Nineteenth-century proponents of anti-profanity rules might have
employed the traditional, Aristotelian moral vocabulary,137  invoking
concerns about protecting the character of our youth, but is this really any
different than what we are concerned about today when we speak of a
young person's psychological well-being? Indeed, modern psychologists
often implicitly appeal to a kind of teleological understanding of human
development that underlies more traditional notions of character
development.131 Whether cast in the older Aristotelian ideal of "fostering
good character," or in the more recent psychological vocabulary, the interest
is the same. We recognize the "moral harm" in being prematurely exposed
to sexually-explicit speech or conduct as it was recognized previously even
though our conceptual paradigm has changed.
Nor are these kinds of character-based justifications limited to the
protection of youth. From laws prohibiting lotteries, 39 alcohol,2 4° and
237 Traditional conceptions of moral development adhere to Aristotle's idea that persons
have a specific purpose or moral end, which Aristotle referred to as our telos. See Artistole,
Nicomachean Ethics in TME BASIc WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 935, 952-64 (Richard McKeon ed.,
1941). See also GEORGE, supra note 25 (defending Artistotelian moral psychology against the
modern liberal view). By pursuing virtuous activity in a habitual way, one develops good char-
acter and achieves "eudemonia," a Greek term for the kind of deep happiness experienced
by a life well-lived. Id. In sum, true happiness requires that one live in accordance with
virtue. By protecting the individual from morally deflationary influences, law can help guide
us toward our natural teos.
238 See I LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, ESSAYS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT (1981). See also
LAWRENCE KOHLBERG ET AL., CHILD PSYCHOLOGY AND CHILDHOOD EDUCATION: A COGNITIVE-
DEVELOPMENTAL VIEW 15-39 (1987); RICHARD H. HERSH ET AL., PROMOTING MORAL GROWTH:
FROM PIAGET To KOHLBERG (i990) (tracing the development of the idea in modern psychology
that human beings follow distinct developmental phases of moral and psychological develop-
ment).
239 See Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 224 (19o5) ("For a great many years past gambling
has been very generally in this country regarded as a vice, to be prevented and suppressed
in the interest of the public morals and the public welfare."); see also Champion v. Ames, I88
U.S. at 363-64 (19o3) (upholding federal law prohibiting interstate transportation of lottery
tickets).
240 See Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 9o-91 (189 o ) (describing the complex of
moral and physical effects of alcohol.) In Crowley, alcohol was said to have effects on the
drinker's "health, which the habit undermines; in his morals, which it weakens, and in the
self-abasement which it creates. But, as it leads to neglect of business and waste of property,
and general demoralization, it affects those who are immediately connected with and depen-
dent upon him." Id. See also Muggier v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (upholding Kansas law
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polygamy 41 enacted more than a century ago to modern-day laws banning
drug use, prostitution, and even television advertising for cigarettes, 4 laws
today protect the same kinds of governmental interests once associated
with the protection of character. As Robert George puts it, the state has
an interest in protecting a shared "moral ecology in which people make
their morally self-constituting choices."143 Of course, today we are more
willing to protect the individual paternalistically from his own choices and
less willing to make "moralistic" judgments about his behavior than we
were a century ago. Modern pasternolism, however, has many of the same
goals and effects as the moralism of the traditionalist. Consider seatbelt
and motorcycle helmet laws, paradigm instances of paternalism. Not only
do these laws restrain bad choices by threat of some legal sanction, over
the long term they "teach" people which choices to make and inculcate
steady habits (e.g., habitually strapping in when one gets into a vehicle).2"
These are examples of the conservative character-shaping function of law
to which liberals are usually opposed.
Indeed, there is a double irony in this modern linguistic subterfuge.
From the true Millian perspective, it is no more permissible for the state to
act paternalistically than moralistically. Thus, it is not clear what the "payoff"
is for those who persist in characterizing their mission as essentially Millian.
Secondly, while we may have shifted our vocabulary, we have not altered
our underlying concerns. What seems to motivate modern prohibitions
of drugs and prostitution-two of many potential examples-seems to be
exactly the same kinds of concerns that motivated nineteenth--century
moralistic prohibitions on lotteries, alcohol use, and prostitution. What
might once have been couched in terms of the de-sacralization of sexual
relations, today will be characterized as the commodification of sex. 45
What once was characterized as moral decadence will now be described
in the modern psychological vocabulary of habituation, psychological
prohibiting the manufacture of alcohol).
241 See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341 (1890) (finding that polygamy tends to "de-
stroy the purity of the marriage relation, to disturb the peace of families, to degrade women
and to debase men.").
242 See, e.g., Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 346 (1986) (up-
holding Puerto Rican regulation on casino advertising by analogizing it to state interest in
regulating speech concerning cigarettes, alcohol, and prostitution); See also Robert E. Goodin,
Pertmissible Paternalism: In Defense of the Nanny State, in ThE EssErIAL. COMMUNITARIAN READER
115-24 (Amitai Etzioini ed., 1996) (defending a paternalistic conception of the state and the
legitimacy of such laws).
243 GEORGE, supra note 25, at I (arguing that law has an important role to play in helping
people shape their moral character).
244 See Herbert Morris, A Paternalistic Theory of Punishment in PATERNALISM, supra note 17,
at 139-52 (defending a paternalistic conception of punishment which seeks the improvement
of the offender's own character).
245 See RADIN, supra note I6o.
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dependency, or regression. The paradigm has changed, but, contrary to
the claims of the recent quasi-Millians, we are no less concerned with the
development of moral character today than we were a century ago.
D. Protecting Essential Values and Social Institutions
Can the state ever legislate to protect an abstract value independently
of the material interests associated with the value? For example, anti-
discrimination laws prohibit discrimination in particular cases and, to that
extent, prevent particularized harms to specific individuals. Yet, they also
undoubtedly contribute to a more general ethic of anti-discrimination,
literally inculcating the value of equality by using the force of law to foster
a non-discriminatory value system within society. This section considers
whether states have a legitimate interest in preserving and protecting
essential values such as equality or respect for life.
Certain strands of liberal political thought counsel that the "moral
neutrality" requirement entails that states have no conceivable legitimate
interest in fostering or transmitting any values or protecting traditional social
institutions. Yet there are three well-known philosophical problems with
this position. First, as Isaiah Berlin and other theorists broadly sympathetic
to the liberal tradition have pointed out, a rigorous commitment to "moral
neutrality" has the paradoxical effect of "driving out" liberal values to the
extent that it requires the liberal to accept sub-cultures which embrace
non-liberal values and institutions.2 46 The "neutral" liberal's commitment
to be "open" to all values and lifestyles compels acceptance of neo-Nazi or
Islamic fundamentalist sub-cultures, for example, which are antagonistic to
a liberal ethos and which may denigrate women, Jews, and other outsiders.
The liberal simply has to take a stand on some moral issues if for no other
reason than to protect his own liberal commitments.
Second, not only is a stance of strict moral neutrality dangerous to a
liberal social ethic, strict neutrality is ultimately philosophically incoherent.
It is impossible for the state to observe a stance of strict moral neutrality
because even a decision not to intervene in certain activities will have
moral consequences.147 Indeed, the strangest aspect of the demand for
246 See ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY I 18 (1969); see also JOHN GRAY, ISMAH
BERLIN: A LIFE IO-12 (1996) (discussing Berlin's treatment of value incommensurability and
its implications for liberalism).
247 A thorough discussion of this is beyond the scope of this Article, but two examples
will do: one from philosophical literature, the other from constitutional case law.
Nozick raised the example of the State's neutrality as between the claims of a rapist who
wishes to pursue his own "conception of the good" and the victim. NoziCK, supra note 20, at
272-73. By threatening to punish him for rape, the state is acting non-neutrally, and obviously
rightly so. Id. While advocates of neutrality have replied even to arguments such as this, it ap-
pears impossible to imagine a scheme of true neutrality without a background conception of
rights to tell us when state action preserves "equal chances in life" between different parties
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neutrality is that those who make it seem not to recognize that it is itself
usually advanced in the name of such particular, albeit important, moral
values such as liberty and equality.
Finally, it is fair to question whether liberal advocates of moral neutrality
really mean what they say. In their unguarded moments, liberals believe
as much as conservatives do that the state has an important function in
promoting certain moral values; they simply happen to disagree about
which values we should protect. 4 They will support legislation which
ensures diversity in higher education 49  or requires gender inclusion
in social and business organizations.5 0 Perhaps it does not go too far to
speculate that they accept these policies not only for the material goods
they foster in preventing particular harms but more generally for the values
they engender, promulgate, and promote. If this is a fair criticism, then
liberals do not seek neutrality any more than conservatives do.
As a constitutional matter, the Supreme Court has regularly upheld the
legitimacy of protecting moral values independently of the material interests
associated with these values. For example, in Washington v. Glucksberg,
upholding a state ban on assisted suicide, the Court recognized two distinct
abstract values as minimally legitimate. It found that the state had "an
unqualified interest in the preservation of human life.""'' Importantly, the
interest was not limited to the protection of particular lives. The Court said
that this "interest is symbolic and aspirational as well as practical" ' and
went on to observe that "the ban against assisted suicide and euthanasia
shores up the notion of limits in human relationships. It reflects the gravity
and when it distorts these equal chances. This background conception of rights, however, is
likely to be as controversial as the asserted basis for state action to promote some moral ideal
or value.
Secondly, consider Lyng v. International Union, wherein the controversy involved a con-
gressional amendment to the Food Stamp Act which provided that food stamps allotment
would not increase to families with a member on strike. Lyng v. Int'l. Union, 485 U.S. 360,
362 (1988). The purpose was to ensure that the government remained "neutral" as between
strikers and management that it did not assist the striking side by providing increased food
stamp benefits. Id. at 362, 371-73. The majority upheld the amendment on these grounds
while the dissent complained that this created gross disparities between strikers and those
who quit their jobs or did not work for other reasons. Id. at 373-75. Which position, we may
ask, was the more "neutral?"
248 As critics of liberalism have pointed out, liberalism purports to achieve its purposes
neutrally, but in fact, liberal theories reflect one or another value bias. See, e.g., SANDEL, supra
note 85 (criticizing both Rawlsian left-liberalism and Nozick's libertarianism).
249 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327-29 (2003) (upholding the promotion of
educational diversity as a compelling state interest).
250 See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 621 (1984) (upholding as a compelling state
interest the promotion of gender equality).
251 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,728 (1997) (quoting Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep't
of Health, 497 U.S. 26i, 282 (1990)).
252 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 729.
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with which we view the decision to take one's own life or the life of another,
and our reluctance to encourage or promote these decisions." ' 3
Related to this, the Court endorsed the state interest in preventing a
slippery slope effect, whereby "assisted suicide will start it down the path
to voluntary and perhaps even involuntary euthanasia.""s These interests
are nothing if not emanations of a deeper and more general interest in
fostering, expressing, and reinforcing the value of respect for human life.
The Court in Glucksberg also recognized a particularized state interest in
"protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession." 5 ' From the
Court's perspective, the state had a legitimate concern for maintaining high
standards of professional conduct,"5 6 protecting "the trust that is essential
to the doctor-patient relationship," ' 7 and preventing a "blurring [of] the
time-honored line between healing and harming." '58 Similarly, in Gonzales
v. Carhat,59 the recent partial birth abortion case, the Court approved
of Congress's finding that permitting late term abortions would "further
coarsen society to the humanity of not only newborns, but all vulnerable
and innocent human life"' 6° and noted that Congress sought to "draw a
bright line that clearly distinguishes abortion and infanticide.
2 61
What are these state interests if not the protection of essential values-
values that have significance independent of more particularized harms?
It might be objected that we only protect these values in order to protect
particular human lives, that there is always a real, empirical harm underlying
the normative gloss. This does not, however, appear to be the import of
these decisions. The Court appears to signal that the protection of moral
values has another function besides harm-prevention. One function is
to teach the value-i.e., to have the individual internalize it because of its
intrinsic importance. Another function is to bracket certain activities in
order to counsel individual and collective reflection about them.
When we place assisted suicide off-limits to shore-up the notion of
limits in human relationships, we are not simply seeking to prevent
some specific harm in the future; we are underscoring the gravity of the
253 Id.
254 Id. at 732.
255 Id. at 73 .
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
26o Id. at 157 (quoting Partial-Birth Abortion Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. io8-io 5 , §
2(14)(N), 117 Stat. 1201, 12o6 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006)).
261 Carhat, 550 U.S. at 158 (quoting Partial-Birth Abortion Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
io8-1o5, § z(4)(G), 117 Stat. 1201, 1205 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2OO6)). The Court
also determined that Congress could protect the integrity of the medical profession and the
public's view of "the appropriate role of a physician during the delivery process." Carhar', 550
U.S. at i6o.
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life-taking decision. We may hope to encourage individuals to reflect on
these issues, even if we should ultimately collectively decide that when a
seriously terminally ill person chooses to take their own life it is not "harm"
at all. The value is important as a kind of social marker. When the state
underwrites certain values, its goal is not simply the primary consequence
of harm-prevention but the secondary and more general consequence of
placing brackets around a particular activity, often in situations where social
attitudes are quickly changing, and encouraging deeper reflection about
them. It is to express society's conviction that we should go slow.6 '
Of course, neo-Millians may simply reject these other functions as
illegitimate. They may insist that there must be some direct connection
between the protection of a value and the prevention of "harm," and
without this connection, the state lacks a legitimate interest in legislating.
Even this position, however, may represent another significant departure
from the harm principle.2 63 At any rate, as the present discussion makes
clear, the courts have not warmed to the neo-Millian position. They not
only protect abstract moral values but also appear to protect them for
reasons that have little to do with the immediate prevention of harm.
6 4
E. Legislating "Morality as Such"
We are now led to what has been the theoretical Maginot Line between
modern liberals and conservatives. We have seen that Mill used the
concept of harm to draw the line between public power and private right,
and that modern liberals follow some version of this distinction though
many accept a greatly expanded concept of harm, leaving the government
considerably more latitude to intervene in ways which Mill would have
262 There is no doubt that even this bracketing function serves a "conservative" social
goal insofar as it functions to retard ill-considered social changes that may be irrevocable.
Marking out certain activities will usually be intended to "conserve" a certain moral frame-
work and cuts against the unintended consequences of rapid social changes. We should keep
in mind, however, that "liberal" social goals - e.g., equality, anti-discrimination, autonomy
- can be "conserved" in this way as well.
263 The problem is that protecting abstract values usually requires a much more general
"zone of prohibition" than true Millians wish to see. Legislating to prevent the slippery slope
provides the best example of this. Mill insisted that one private or non-harm producing act
cannot normally be prohibited in order to prevent harm from another act. Mill rejected regu-
lating those who are "injurious by [their] example." See MILL, supra note 2, at 147, 149-50. We
cannot prohibit the terminally ill from using assisted suicide if our real goal is to prevent it
from being offered to the non-terminally ill, for example. Nor could we prohibit one (presum-
ably permissible) form of abortion in order to prevent the slide to other forms. In fact, insofar
as the purpose of the law is to affect human attitudes, to prevent our values from coarsening,
this would simply be off-limits to the serious Millian. So the liberal who embraces any form
of values legislation as legitimate has already rejected what lies at the heart of the harm prin-
ciple.
264 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
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rejected . 65 Nevertheless, however broadly modern liberals may wish to
define the concept of harm, there comes a point where the prevention
of harm ends and purely "moralistic" intervention begins. This, at least,
has been the lesson of the Hart-Devlin debate and ensuing exchanges
between liberals and conservatives.2 66 This is supposed to be the point
where liberals will draw their line in the sand and insist that government
has no right to legislate-the point beyond which the state is, as Hart put
it, legislating "morality as such."1
67
What Hart called regulating "morality as such," however, consists
either of empirical claims (though often of a weak or disputed variety) over
which the legislature has control under one or more of the four types of
justification above, or they represent the kinds of appeals to retributive
or natural law conceptions upon which no advocate of state intervention
need rely. 6' Thus, the argument surrounding regulating morality for the
sake of morality is indeed a Maginot Line-a well-fortified but easily
circumvented defensive line that no liberal need draw and no conservative
need attack.
Hart distinguished two varieties of conservative argument which, if
accepted, would permit regulating for the sake of "morality as such."169 He
called these the "moderate" and the "extreme" theses.7 ' The moderate
thesis advocates regulating to prevent certain generalized social evils
which do not qualify as Millian harms because they affect society as a
whole without harming any particular individual. These generalized social
evils-Feinberg calls them "free-floating social harms"-include such
conditions as the breakdown of civility, the coarsening of human sentiments
or a loosening of communal ties that rest upon a shared communal morality,
265 See MILL, supra note 2.
z66 See supra note 6.
267 HART, supra note 6.
268 See id.
269 See id. at 48.
270 Id. at 48-49. The difference between the two is that the "moderate" thesis is based
on certain kinds of generalized harms to society at large-the breakdown of the social fab-
ric-caused by the failure to enforce morality. The moderate thesis is thus still broadly utilitar-
ian in that it justifies punishing behavior that harms no particular individual by claiming that
such behavior nevertheless harms society as a whole. Id. The "extreme" thesis, in contrast,
enforces morality for morality's sake, independently of any appeal to socially beneficial con-
sequences. Id. Hart concluded that Stephens generally defended the extreme thesis and
Devlin the moderate thesis. Id. at 55. Joel Feinberg drew a similar distinction between legal
moralism in the broad and narrow senses. Legal moralism in the broad sense holds that the
state is justified in prohibiting "certain actions that cause neither harm nor offense to anyone,
on the grounds that such actions constitute or cause evils of other ('free-floating') kinds."
FEINBERG, supra note 21, at 27. Legal moralism in the narrow sense parallels Hart's extreme
thesis. It holds that "[it can be morally legitimate to prohibit conduct on the ground that it
is inherently immoral...." Id.
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etc. 7' Advocates of the moderate thesis, Hart argued, want to preserve a
shared morality to preserve society and to prevent the evils associated with
social disintegration."' 2 Shoring up morality is a means, from the moderate
perspective, to the end of preserving existing social order. 73 Advocates of
the extreme thesis, on the other hand, assert that the law should protect a
common morality not for the sake of society, but for the sake of morality.
74
Even if there were no changes in society wrought by the spread of some
putatively immoral act, defenders of the extreme thesis would insist on
prohibiting the activity because it is viewed to be an affront to morality
itself.
As we have just seen, the Court has recognized state interests in
preventing the coarsening of human sentiments, protecting certain
essential values and institutions such as the value of respect for life or the
value of non-discrimination and protecting the institutions of civil society,
including the family."7 ' It can even protect some of these interests as
abstract expressions of value independently of particular instantiations of
that value. For example, it can protect the value of life over and above
protecting particular lives to the extent that these are intended to preserve
social order. Thus it is clear that states may regulate on the basis of what
Hart called the moderate thesis.
This does not mean that we should accept all versions of the moderate
thesis. As we noted in Part I, Hart did indeed demolish Devlin's version
of the moderate thesis, but only because Devlin was drawn into defending
an overly abstracted version of the thesis. He argued as if society were
a concrete object with a univocal and unchanging moral order such that
any changes in this morality would spell destruction of this society as we
know it. Devlin wrote that "society is not something that is kept together
physically; it is held together by the invisible bonds of common thought. If
the bonds were too far relaxed the members would drift apart. A common
morality is part of the bondage." 7 6 Hart appropriately responded that
Devlin appears to move from the acceptable proposition that "some shared
morality is essential to the existence of any society to the unacceptable
proposition that a society is identical with its morality as that is at any given
271 The moderate thesis might even qualify as a "harm-based" justification, given a
broad enough conception of harm. See FEINBERG, supra note 21, at 22-27. While it does not
involve harm to particular individuals, it does encompass more generalized social harms such
as "the decay of the family structure" or changes in the basic ways human beings communi-
cate with others. FEINBERG, supra note 6, at 20-25 (discussing what he means by "free-floating
evils," such as generalized harms that do not sufficiently affect any individual's interests to be
considered 'harms')
272 See HART, supra note 6, at 53-54.
273 See id.
274 See id. at 54.
275 See supra notes 67-74.
276 DEVLIN, supra note 6, at o.
2009-20101
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
moment of its history, so that a change in its morality is tantamount to the
destruction of a society."
2 77
Rather than defending specific values and particular institutions on
grounds that these are necessary to prevent various concrete social evils
which do not rise to the level of a Millian harm, Devlin defended the absurd
view that any change in morality amounted to the defacto destruction of
society. As Hart put it:
[Elven if the conventional morality did so change, the
society would not have been destroyed or "subverted."
We should compare such a development not to the
violent overthrow of government but to a peaceful
constitutional change in its form, consistent not only with
the preservation of a society but with its advance. 78
Advocates of morals legislation need not rely on anything like this
conception of social morality. They can defend the legitimate authority
of the State to reinforce basic moral ideals and social institutions for their
capacity to ensure human well-being.
What about the extreme thesis? Hart introduces the extreme thesis in
Kantian or broadly non-utilitarian terms:
[T]he extreme thesis does not ... justify the punishment
of immorality as a step taken, like the punishment of
treason, to preserve society from dissolution or collapse.
Instead, the enforcement of morality is regarded as a
thing of value, even if immoral acts harm no one directly, or
indirectly by weakening the moral cement of society. 79
Hart defines the extreme thesis in terms of the enforcement of morality
for the sake of morality itself, rather than as a means to preserving social
order. It is an "extreme" view in the sense that those who hold it believe
that morals laws can be justified without reference to any identifiable
social affect at all. Behavior deemed to be immoral is prohibited simply
because it is immoral, even in the absence of any other harms prevented
or benefits gained from prohibiting the behavior. While some theologians
and philosophers of past ages may have held some version of the extreme
thesis,"" Hart's discussion demonstrates just how infrequent and marginal
277 HART, supra note 6, at 51 (emphasis in original).
278 Id. at 52.
279 Id. at 49 (emphasis added).
z8o See T os AQUINAS, 2 SUMMA THEOLOGICA 232 (Fathers of the English Dominican
Privince, trans., Christian Classics 1981). Those most likely to have defended morals legisla-
tion on these grounds include orthodox theologians and natural law theorists who believe that
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a role it has played in modern conservative thought.""' If the extreme
thesis is understood to mean that some activities may be criminalized
simply because they are thought to be immoral-that the law may be used
to uphold a moral value or principle without performing any other social
function-then Hart apparently could not find a single example of this in
recent legal and political thought. Instead, his discussions examined some
of the functions of morals legislation surveyed earlier here."'2 He considered
the use of morals legislation to deter private, non-harmful behavior such
as homosexual acts and raised several plausible utilitarian objections to
this."' Hart also explored and rejected the moral-educative function
of law.' 4 Neither of these functions of morals legislation, however, are
examples of legislating merely for the sake of upholding a moral principle.
Whether or not deterring non-harmful conduct or shaping values has a
place in a liberal-democratic system of justice, they have the very real,
social functions of deterring and educating. These simply are not instances
of legislating purely to vindicate the sanctity of a moral value. Even where
Hart comes closest, in discussing Stephen's advocacy of the denunciatory
function of law-such as legislating to express condemnation and to vent
society's moral outrage directed to some activity, 85 it is not a pure example
human laws should reflect, at least to some extent, divine ordinances. Yet even many of these
thinkers did not believe that morality should be enforced purely for the sake of morality. St.
Thomas Aquinas, the greatest of the natural law thinkers, for example, believed that law ex-
ists "to lead men to virtue, not suddenly, but gradually." Id. He also explicitly concluded that
laws "[do] not lay upon the multitude of imperfect men the burdens of those who are already
virtuous . . . [since those] unable to bear such precepts, would break out into yet greater
evils." Id. Even when the law should prohibit vice, moreover, Aquinas and other natural law
theorists would not frame the matter in the same way as Hart See id. Hart's extreme thesis
has a Kantian ring to it insofar as it suggests that morality can be enforced purely for the sake
of morality. See HART, supra note 6, at 49; IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS
OF MORALS 7 (James W. Ellington, trans., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1981) (I797). Yet Aquinas, who
wrote 500 years before Kant, would not have endorsed such a deontological conception of
morals legislation. See AQUINAS, supra. Aquinas and other natural law theorists thought that
law has a moral-educative function similar to that which we have already examined. Seesupra
Part IV. Morality is not enforced for the sake of morality. It is enforced for the sake of bring-
ing people's characters into conformity with virtue. Only someone writing after Kant could
defend (or conceive) something quite like Hart's extreme thesis. See KANT, supra, at 7-17
(discussing the development of Kant's nonteleological moral theory).
281 See HART, supra note 6, at 48-84.
z82 See supra notes 159-164 and accompanying text.
283 See HART, supra note 6, at 57 ("[It isleasy to understand" punishing harmful behavior
but "when there is no harm to be prevented and no potential victim to be protected ... it is
difficult to understand the assertion that conformity ... is a value worth pursuing notwith-
standing the misery and sacrifice of freedom which it involves.")
284 See id. at S8 ("Much morality is certainly taught and sustained without it [fear of legal
punishment], and where morality is taught with it, there is the standing danger that fear of
punishment may remain the sole motive for conformity.").
285 Hart rejects the denunciatory function, contending that punishing "as a means of
2009-20101
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
of the extreme thesis. The denunciatory justification functions partially as
a kind of social catharsis by allowing what are thought to be the pent-up
feelings of moral outrage experienced by the "moral majority."
The point of all this is not to suggest that Hart was wrong in concluding
that there is little point in deterring some non-harmful acts or that using
law in an expressive manner presents its own moral difficulties. Rather,
Hart's error was to collapse and unnecessarily dichotomize the criminal law
into two categories: those that prevent harm and those that merely regulate
"morality as such." Instead of only two categories there is in fact an
intermediate spectrum of permissible justifications between the two. His
discussion of the extreme thesis, moreover, critiques a position which few
conservatives in recent memory have defended, and which no conservative
need ever defend.
The crucial distinction for us to draw today is not the distinction
between laws that prevent real harms and laws that regulate "morality as
such," but rather, the distinction between the permissible use of law to
achieve some legitimate social affect and the impermissible use of law to
express "the feeling of hatred and the desire of vengeance," 8 6 as Stephen
put it in the nineteenth century, or to vent "intolerance, indignation and
disgust" as Devlin reiterated the idea in the 1960s. 87 This, as the next
section demonstrates, is the lesson of Lawrence v. Texas.
V. THREE READINGS OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS
A. The All-Encompassing View
Lawrence v. Texas can be, and has been, read in three alternative ways.
The first and broadest interpretation reads Lawrence to have declared
something approximating a general right of intimate sexual conduct between
consenting adults. 88 It entails that states will never have any legitimate
state interest, whether based on health, safety, or morals, sufficient to
justify laws regulating fornication, adultery, homosexuality, and possibly
other consensual sexual acts such as incest and sadomasochistic activity.
There is language in Lawrence which renders this reading plausible, at least
if read independently of other considerations. Referring to the petitioners,
adult homosexual men, in Lawrence, the Court said:
The State cannot demean their existence or control their
venting or emphatically expressing moral condemnation is uncomfortably close to human
sacrifice as an expression of religious worship." HART, supra note 6, at 65-66.
286 STEPHEN, Supra note 25, at 162.
287 DEVLIN, supra note 6, at 17.
288 See Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367, 370 (Va. 2005) (striking down the state's
fornication law).
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destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their
right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the
full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the
government. It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a
realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter.
The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which
can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the
individual.2 9
At least one state supreme court has interpreted Lawrence in this most
all-encompassing manner. In Martin v. Ziherl, the Virginia Supreme
Court struck down a state law prohibiting sexual intercourse between two
unmarried persons.2 9g The court acknowledged that "[v]alid public reasons
for the law exist," including protection of public health and "encouraging
that children be born into a family consisting of a married couple."' Yet
the court went on to say that "the Supreme Court in Lawrence indicated that
such policies are insufficient to sustain the statute's constitutionality."92
It unequivocally interpreted Lawrence in the most all-encompassing way.
After quoting the language in Lawrence indicating that the "statute furthers
no legitimate ... interest which can justify its intrusion" into the personal
domain, the Martin Court stated:
This statement is not limited to state interests offered by the
state of Texas in support of its statute, but sweeps within it all
manner of states' interests and finds them insufficient when
measured against the intrusion upon a person's liberty interest
when that interest is exercised in the form of private, consensual
sexual conduct between adults.... [Tihis same liberty interest
is invoked in the case when two unmarried adults make the
choice to engage in ... intimate sexual conduct .... 93
Perhaps laws prohibiting sex between unmarried adults are as
"uncommonly silly" today as Justice Stewart thought contraception laws
were in 1965.1' Still, the all-encompassing interpretation of Lawrence
should be rejected for several reasons. As an initial matter, philosophically,
it goes well beyond what even a devout Millian should require insofar as it
entails that states cannot prevent the kinds of material harms such as the
289 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
290 See Marin, 607 S.E.zd at 371.
291 Id. at 370.
292 Id.
293 Id.
294 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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secondary affects of private activity, health, and safety concerns, etc., which
fall squarely within Mill's "public" domain. The ultimate implication of
the decision in Martin is that states are not only foreclosed from acting
for moralistic reasons but that they additionally cannot act for harm-
based reasons if they are regulating consensual sexual activity. The all-
encompassing interpretation entails that the state lacks even a minimally
legitimate interest in protecting the public health or preventing other
material harms. Indeed, it says that no interest whatsoever will be sufficient
to justify laws regulating intimate sexual relations, whatever the public
effects which motivate the law.
Second, the constitutional implications of Martin are breathtaking
because the opinion provides a level of protection for activities that fall
within the sweep of its principle that far surpasses even the lofty level
of protection accorded to abortion rights, contraception, or other rights,
all while claiming to be using rational basis review. Indeed, it absolutely
immunizes these activities. More specifically, not only does the opinion
ignore the ordinary strictures of rational basis review, it altogether inverts
them. In determining whether a state interest is legitimate, normally we
do not balance countervailing state and individual interests. Instead, we
simply ask whether the interest is minimally legitimate. 95 The Martin
Court, however, went beyond even the "balancing" idea, holding that
the individual's liberty interest is always an absolute trump on the state's
interest notwithstanding what the state's interest is or how important it
may be in a particular case. The holding effectively disables the state from
preventing the kinds of health and safety concerns that have sometimes
been recognized as compelling state interests and, again, does so while
purporting to use the lowest level of constitutional scrutiny.
The import of Martin is even more dangerous given the uncertain scope
of its principle. If the ruling is limited to "ordinary," non-commercial
sexual acts between unmarried persons, what is the constitutional principle
for drawing a line between this and such activities as adultery, prostitution,
incest, and sadomasochism? How can there be absolute protection to
the former while recognizing state power over the latter? To the extent,
however, that the principle is intended to go further, or is enlarged in a
subsequent case, the implications are indeed sweeping insofar as it would
prevent a state from reaching the secondary effects of prostitution, the social
and economic effects of adulterous relationships, and, for that matter, the
prohibition of bigamy, polygamy, or incest. It is little wonder that no other
court has adopted the all-encompassing interpretation of Lawrence.
z96
295 See Cicchino, supra note 166.
296 See State v. Freitag, 130 P3d 544, 545-46 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2oo6) (stating that Lawrence
does not protect prostitution); State v. Thomas, 891 So.2d 1233, 1236 (La. 2005) (holding that
Lawrence does not disturb state statutes prohibiting prostitution ); People v. Williams, 811
N.E.zd 1197, 1199 (111. Ct. App. 2004) (ruling that Lawrence specifically excludes prostitution
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B. The Quasi-Millian Interpretation
A second interpretation of Lawrence adopts a quasi-Millian approach to
the case. The quasi-Millian approach recognizes the authority of the state to
regulate on the basis of all empirical justifications, including the protection
of genuine health and safety justifications. It is quasi-Millian insofar as it
follows the modern liberal position recognizing broader authority for the state
to intervene paternalistically and to prevent exploitation, commodification,
and other conditions which Mill would not have considered legitimate
justifications for legislation. What it would prohibit are justifications that
crossed the line from those preventing empirical harms to those reflecting
purely moralistic justifications. 97 Unlike the first and broadest reading of
Lawrence, this interpretation would not completely immunize fornication,
adultery, or other consensual sexual acts. Instead, it would prevent the
state from regulating on the basis of only moralistic justifications.
The quasi-Millian justification is supported by language in Lawrence
itself which directly precedes its ultimate conclusion. The Court
approvingly quotes Justice Stevens' dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick which
stated, "[Tihe fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally
viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for
upholding a law prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tradition
could save a law prohibiting miscegenation ... ,"98 Several commentators
have read Lawrence in precisely this quasi-Millian way. Suzanne Goldberg
argues that the protection of "abstract philosophical justifications" or moral
values disembodied from factual concerns can never be legitimate and
that "'all justifications for government action, including those reflecting
particular moral concerns, be tied to demonstrable facts." 99 Requiring a
factual basis for laws, Goldberg argues, would provide courts with a neutral
and objective rationale for decision-making, one that avoids the dilemma
of either simply deferring to majoritarian sentiments, on one hand, or
imposing the judge's values, on the other.3°° Peter Cicchino draws a similar
from its analysis); State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 743 (Utah 2oo6) (stating that Lawrence does not
protect polygamous marriage); Williams v. Att'y Gen. of Ala., 378 E3d 1232 0 ith Cir. 2004)
(holding that Lawrence does not protect the sale or private use of sex toys); State v. Senters,
699 N.W.2d 8io, 816 (Neb. 2005) (stating that Lawrence does not extend to consensual sex
with a minor). Even in Virginia, Lawrence was limited to consensual conduct which takes place
behind close doors. See Singson v. Commonwealth, 621 S.E.2d 682, 687 (Va. 2005) (upholding
a conviction for soliciting oral sex in a public restroom).
297 See HART, supra note 6.
298 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 2 16 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
299 Goldberg, supra note 27, at 1236.
300 See id. at 1238-4 o (arguing that judges are faced with a "double-edged predicament,"
because requiring a demonstration of an empirical harm would restrict courts to a more
scientific assessment of the empirical concerns motivating the law).
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distinction between "bare assertions of 'public morality' and "arguments
based on 'public welfare.' 30 t "A bare assertion of public morality, divorced
from any empirical effect on the public welfare," he maintains, "cannot
constitute a legitimate government interest."3 2
As we have suggested already, however, the quasi-Millian formulation
proves too much and too little. It proves too much in the sense that it
disables states from legally enshrining basic moral principles embodied
in our traditions as discussed in Part IV.D above. It prevents the state
from protecting abstract values independently of the particular instances
of harm that may result from a departure from these moral principles. It
prevents the state from declaring that sex should not be the subject of
market transactions, that racism is inherently wrong, that spouses should
be faithful to one another, that out-of-wedlock teen pregnancy should
be discouraged, that the value of human life is sacred independently of
the particular lives that may be saved by prohibitions on killing, that the
remains of the dead should not be furtively abused even when, virtually
by definition, there can be no "empirical harm" to the deceased or to their
unwitting relatives.
In another respect, however, the quasi-Millian interpretation does
not go far enough because it opens the door to constitutional legitimacy
whenever the state can adduce some putative empirical interest in
limiting a behavior. Goldberg admits as much near the end of her article
in recognizing that "the empirical grounding constraint may not provide
a meaningful constraint" since defenders of such laws can always make
"highly speculative arguments about factual harms and thereby render
the empirical grounding requirement useless. ' 30 3 She cites a case which
upheld a ban on gay adoption on grounds that straight parents were better
able to provide a stable environment and upbringing for the (presumably
straight) adopted children.301 Quasi-Millian rationales do not succeed
within the context of rational basis review because, as discussed in Part III,
judicial deference with respect to the means requirement permits states
to circumvent the quasi-Millian paper tiger by legislating on the basis of
some made-up empirical harm constructed in aposthoc manner, even when
the true motive may be animus directed against gays and lesbians or other
politically vulnerable groups.
301 Cicchino, supra note I66, at 140 ("'Bare public morality' arguments defend a law
by asserting a legitimate government interest in prohibiting or encouraging certain human
behavior without any empirical connection to the goods other than the alleged good of
eliminating or increasing ... the behavior at issue. 'Public welfare' arguments, in contrast,
defend a law by asserting that the law avoids harms or realizes goods other than the good of
eliminating or increasing the behavior...
302 Id. at 142.
303 Goldberg, supra note 27, at 1307.
304 Id. (citing Loftus v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children and Family Serv., 358 F3d 804 (i ith
Cir. zoo4)).
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C. The Meaning of Lawrence
What, then, are we to make of the meaning of Lawrence? Consider
three points relevant to our discussion of homosexuality and rational basis
review. First, as we have just seen, it is almost impossible to attack the
constitutionality of a law on the basis of the "means" requirement on rational
basis review.30 5 This means that laws may be passed pre-textually, where
a more "empirical" state interest (e.g., preventing the spread of sexually-
transmitted diseases) stands in for what may be an irrational bias or animus
on the basis of highly disputable empirical premises which purport to
connect the harm the state claims to be combating to the regulated activity
(e.g., consensual homosexual relations). Thus, while the quasi-Millian
reading of Lawrence may go further to disable states from passing some
forms of morals legislation to the extent that they are predicated on purely
"moral" concerns, it does not go far enough in the context of anti-sodomy
laws which, in the post-AIDS era, can always be justified on empirical
grounds.
Second, laws prohibiting homosexuality are likely to be singularly
immune to legislative revision even as they are susceptible to selective
enforcement. Even when a majority may no longer view homosexuality
as immoral or, at any rate, worthy of legal prohibition, a powerful "moral
minority" can make it politically inexpedient for the legislature to revisit
the issue. Prohibitions on homosexual conduct provide a prime example
of the situation where a law may be retained on the books long after the
majority has changed their mind about the morality of the act.
Finally, and most crucially, Lawrence involves the same basic concerns
about animus that motivated the Court to strike down the challenged laws
in the Moreno,3 °6 Cleburne,3 °7 and, of course, Rome,-30 8 cases. Moreno, the
"hippie food stamp case" made clear that "if the constitutional conception
of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least
mean that a bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot
constitute a legitimate government interest."3  As Justice Kennedy, who
wrote the opinions in Romer and Lawrence, said in Romer.
By requiring that the classification bear a rational relationship
to an independent and legitimate legislative end, we
305 See supra notes 167-i8o and accompanying text (discussing the problems of over
and under-inclusiveness and problems associated with the deference given to legislatures on
empirically disputed issues).
306 See U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
307 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
308 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 6zo (1996).
309 Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534.
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ensure the classifications are not drawn for the purpose
of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law. If the
adverse impact on the disadvantaged class is an apparent
aim of the legislature, its impartiality would be suspect.3z°
The Court later observed more pointedly that "laws of the kind now before
us raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of
animosity toward the class of persons affected.
311
As analogous as fornication or adultery appear to be to consensual
homosexuality given that each concerns consensual non-marital or extra-
marital sex, laws prohibiting fornication and adultery are not motivated by
the same kind of personal animus that motivates anti-sodomy laws. When
the heterosexual majority criminalizes heterosexual acts, the operative
"us and them" distinction that applies in the context of homosexuality is
obviously inapposite. Moreover, to Justice Scalia's objection that laws that
single out a behavior always single out the class of persons who engage in
the behavior, that anti-nudist laws do to nudists what anti-sodomy laws do
to homosexuals, 31 our response can only be to advert to the structure of
Texas's anti-sodomy law and point out that it manifestly did not apply to
homosexuals and heterosexuals alike; it exempted heterosexual sodomy.
Thus, we are safe in concluding that the Texas law did not legislate against
an activity; it legislated against the class of persons most likely to engage in
the activity while exempting the majority who may, as a numerical matter,
commit a greater number of such acts. In this way the law raises the same
specter of political animus the Court found present in Romer
Given the normal strictures of rational basis review, how are we to
understand the Court's function in Lawrence? In other words, given the
highly deferential stance accorded legislation on rational basis review, on
what basis could the Court draw the distinction it did between legislating
against a genuine social harm and legislating against an unpopular or
vulnerable group? An eminent constitutional scholar has suggested that
the Court sometimes engages in a "checking" function, that it sometimes
decides cases to act as "checks" against legislative over-reaching in
cases where it may otherwise be difficult to draw airtight distinctions of
principle. 313 The 1995 Lopez case arguably involved just such an exercise of
the checking function in the Commerce Clause context, another area where
courts have found it difficult to cabin legislative authority.314 Lawrence is to
31o Romer, 517 U.S. at 633 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
311 Id. at 634.
312 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 6oi (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
313 See PHILIP BOBBITr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 209--il
(1982)'(the checking functions serves an expressive purpose to "indicate that some constitu-
tional boundary has been reached" even if it is not well-marked out textually or doctrinally).
314 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding the federal Gun Free School
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the state police power what Lopez and later UnitedStates v. Motrison"5 were
to the federal commerce power. In each case, the Court was seeking not
so much to draw a line in the sand as to remind the Legislative Branch
that it sometimes has to do better than to simply assert some ground for
legislative authority. While the states retain broad authority to regulate even
consensual sexual activity among adults, they must regulate even-handedly,
for genuine empirical reasons, and must seek to regulate an activity rather
than impose a disability upon a vulnerable or unpopular group. This is
what Justice Kennedy had in mind when he declared that "[the] statute
furthers no legitimate state interest that can justify its intrusion" into the
life of the Petitioner.
316
CONCLUSION
Since the Hart-Devlin debate, the furor over "morals legislation" has
been skewed by the treatment of homosexuality. In seeking to protect
homosexuals, liberals have pretended to embrace a principle they generally
do not accept in other contexts. The exceptions they have made to the
harm principle, particularly their acceptance of paternalism, is outmatched
only by the way in which they have expanded the concept of harm in order
to justify increased government intervention to foster the kinds of social
values that cannot be furthered under a genuinely Millian regime. As
for conservatives, at least since Devlin's time, they have defended broad
government intervention on the basis of unnecessarily crude principles in
defense of laws limiting a practice which many conservatives believe should
not concern the law in the first place. Liberals have sought to throw the
baby out with the bathwater while conservatives have found themselves
defending principles which resemble anything but the limited government
philosophy they normally embrace in other contexts.
Lawrence should be understood not as the first step in a new libertarian
revolution against all forms of morals legislation but as the constitutional
denouement of two converging trends. As liberals have retreated from the
harm principle to a more moderate stand against legislating "morality
as such," the courts have retreated from the traditional recognition of
unlimited state power in all matters that touch on morality to a sober,
circumscribed recognition that while the State has in important role to play
in shaping and expressing public morality, it may not merely reflect "a bare
... desire to harm a politically unpopular group .... ."311 Lawrence embodies
Zone Act of 199o unconstitutional for exceeding the scope of the commerce power).
315 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 528 (2ooo) (holding that the civil penalty
provisions of the Violence Against Women Act exceeded the scope of congressional power
under the commerce clause).
316 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
317 U.S. Dep't ofAgric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
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the convergence of these two developments.
